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Systemic Risk of Contract
Tal Kastner*
Complexity and uncertainty define our world, now more than
ever. Scholars and practitioners have celebrated modular contract
design as an especially effective tool to manage these challenges.
Modularity divides complex structures into relatively discrete,
independent components with simple connections. The benefits of
this fundamental drafting approach are intuitive. Lawyers divide
contracts into sections and provisions to make them easier to
understand and reduce uncertainty. Dealmakers constructing
complex transactions use portable agreements as building blocks
to reduce drafting costs and enable innovation. Little attention,
however, has been paid to the risks introduced by modularity
in contracts.
This Article demonstrates how this touted and now-ingrained
drafting approach introduces new forms of the very costs it seeks
to minimize. The Article is the first to identify the types of risks
introduced by modularity at the intra-contract level, among
provisions, and the inter-contract level, among agreements that
constitute deals. The Article groups these risks into three
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categories: First, “intertextualism,” which occurs when the
operation of a discrete, or even standard, provision seems clear in
isolation but is made uncertain by the presence of other discrete
terms. Second, “modular drift,” which occurs when drafters
transplant provisions specific to one transactional context into
another transactional context, introducing uncertainty. Third,
“latent triggers,” which occur when compartmentalization
invites error or obscures a nuance in the interaction among
discrete provisions.
The Article urges courts to articulate distinctions between
contract types and offers tools to contract drafters to mitigate
uncertainty. It also makes a theoretical contribution with
implications for contract doctrine and contract innovation. It
shows how modularity can disrupt seemingly stable, standardized
provisions, diminishing their certainty and imposing information
costs on future drafters who seek to rely on precedent provisions
or agreements. It thereby identifies a critical dimension of contract
risk that complicates the balancing of standardization and private
choice in contracts.
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INTRODUCTION
Transactions and the contracts that make them possible have
become increasingly complex, compounding challenges for
contract design and doctrine.1 Contract law is premised on the
belief that private ordering is the best way for parties to actualize
their preferences2 and contract doctrine is geared toward
effectuating parties’ manifested intent.3 But as private ordering
itself increases in complexity, the agreements that put complex
deals and instruments into effect also become harder to
communicate and understand. The $13.7 billion acquisition of
Whole Foods by Amazon, for example, involved an over 70-page
Merger Agreement, in addition to investment vehicles, employment
arrangements, financing agreements, and regulatory approvals, to
name just a few aspects of the deal.4 And, to manage the added
1. See Cathy Hwang & Matthew Jennejohn, The New Research on Contractual
Complexity, 14 CAP. MKTS. L.J. 381, 381–88 (2019) (outlining dimensions of increasing contract
complexity, including the degree of interaction among parts).
2. See Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law,
113 YALE L.J. 541, 544 (2003) (“[C]ontract law should facilitate the efforts of contracting
parties to maximize the joint gains (the ‘contractual surplus’) from transactions.”). Contract
thinkers have presented different theories of contract to support different values served by
contract, but these largely hinge on courts facilitating the intended terms and relationship
between the parties. See, e.g., HANOCH DAGAN & MICHAEL HELLER, THE CHOICE THEORY OF
CONTRACTS 3 (2017) (advocating for different contract types to further autonomy); CHARLES
FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION 1 (1981) (identifying
promise principle “by which persons may impose on themselves obligations where none
existed before” as central to contract law).
3. See, e.g., Hartford Cas. Ins. Co. v. Swift Distrib., Inc., 326 P.3d 253, 288 (Cal. 2014);
Greenfield v. Philles Recs., Inc., 780 N.E.2d 166, 170 (N.Y. 2002); see also John F. Coyle,
Interpreting Forum Selection Clauses, 104 IOWA L. REV. 1791, 1794 (2019) [hereinafter Coyle,
Forum Selection] (“The goal of contract interpretation, generally speaking, is to give effect to
the ‘intent’ of the parties. The best evidence of this intent, in turn, is said to be the language
of the agreement.”) (footnote omitted).
4. See Amazon.com, Inc., Agreement and Plan of Merger by and Among
Amazon.com, Inc., Walnut Merger Sub, Inc. and Whole Foods Market, Inc. (Form 8-K) (June
15, 2017). The transaction structure that prevailed in this deal reflected just one approach
among several proposals. Business Insider, 7 Potential Bidders, a Call to Amazon, and an
Ultimatum: How the Whole Foods Deal Went Down, BUS. INSIDER (Dec. 29, 2017, 11:57 AM),
https://www.businessinsider.com/breaking-it-down-amazon-tough-negotiations-howthe-whole-foods-deal-went-down-2017-12.
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uncertainty resulting from newly salient risks, such as a global
pandemic, deals are likely to include even more provisions.5 In the
face of such complexity, scholars have identified modular design as
an important tool to deal with the contemporary challenges of
private ordering.6
Like Lego blocks that easily mix and match, modular design
breaks complex systems down into relatively discrete components
with simple connections.7 The benefits of this approach to contract
drafting are intuitive and have long been a part of drafting practices
employed at major law firms around the world. Just about every
lawyer expects to see a contract divided into sections and facially
discrete provisions, such as arbitration, forum-selection, and
choice-of-law clauses, which make documents easier to understand
and manage.8 Complex deals, moreover, typically include a
5. Christina M. Sautter, Transaction Cost Economics & MAEs: The Dealmaker’s Crystal
Ball, 89 FORDHAM L. REV. ONLINE 41, 43 (2020).
6. See Robert Anderson & Jeffrey Manns, Engineering Greater Efficiency in Mergers and
Acquisitions, 72 BUS. LAW. 657, 693 (2017) [hereinafter Anderson & Manns, Engineering Greater
Efficiency] (identifying modularity as a way to enable the incorporation of innovations in
merger agreements); Cathy Hwang, Unbundled Bargains: Multi-Agreement Dealmaking in
Complex Mergers and Acquisitions, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1403, 1417–18 (2016) (identifying the
benefits of modular provisions and the use of discrete deal documents in complex
transactions); Cathy Hwang & Matthew Jennejohn, Deal Structure, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 279
(2018) (suggesting that modular design has implications for the interpretive approach used
by courts) [hereinafter Hwang & Jennejohn, Deal Structure]; Henry E. Smith, Modularity in
Contracts: Boilerplate and Information Flow, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1175, 1176, 1186–96 (2006)
(identifying the portability modularity offers as enabling benefits of standardization and
managing complexity) [hereinafter Smith, Modularity in Contracts]; George G. Triantis,
Improving Contract Quality: Modularity, Technology, and Innovation in Contract Design, 18 STAN.
J.L. BUS. & FIN. 177 (2013) (suggesting a model of contract development using modularity
and open-source peer production); see also Harry Surden, Computable Contracts, 46 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 629, 649–50 (2012) (discussing the possibility of representing certain contract terms in
a defined form to enable the encoding and the extraction of the data); ISDA LINKLATERS,
WHITEPAPER: SMART CONTRACTS AND DISTRIBUTED LEDGER—A LEGAL PERSPECTIVE 22 (2017)
[hereinafter ISDA LINKLATERS, WHITEPAPER], https://www.isda.org/a/6EKDE/smartcontracts-and-distributed-ledger-a-legal-perspective.pdf (identifying the potential benefits
of modular definitions in the derivatives market to facilitate the use of new technologies).
7. See 1 CARLISS Y. BALDWIN & KIM B. CLARK, DESIGN RULES: THE POWER OF
MODULARITY 63 n.1 (2000) [hereinafter BALDWIN & CLARK, DESIGN RULES] (noting the
positive impact of modular design on a range of fields that engage complex systems “from
brain science and psychology, to robotics, artificial intelligence and industrial engineering”);
Smith, Modularity in Contracts, supra note 6, at 1186; Christopher S. Yoo, Modularity Theory
and Internet Regulation, 2016 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 4 (2016).
8. Even though modularity is always “a matter of degree” and much of contract
drafting involves deliberate interconnection between parts, best practices of contract drafting
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number of relatively independent agreements, such as equity and
debt commitment letters, management employment agreements,
escrow agreements, and side letters in a private equity or other
merger and acquisition (M&A) deal.9 Even an employment
arrangement between a company and an employee may involve an
employment agreement, stock and other incentive agreements, and
restrictive covenant agreements, among other agreements.10
Scholars of late have therefore celebrated how modular contract
design can break these transactions and agreements into
component parts that are easier to manage, reducing drafting costs
and uncertainty and thereby enabling innovation.11 And, given the
increasing complexity of contemporary transactions and
developing technologies of transacting and drafting contracts, the
use of compartmentalized contract design will likely persist, if
not increase.12
However, little attention has been paid to the risks introduced by
modular design in contract.
have long reinforced aspects of modular design. Smith, Modularity in Contracts, supra note 6,
at 1186–96 (noting defined terms and severability provisions as examples of modular
contract design); Triantis, supra note 6, at 181 (identifying closing conditions, representations
and warranties, covenants, termination rights, indemnification, and dispute resolution
provisions as relatively modular); see also Hwang & Jennejohn, supra note 1, at 285 (noting
the range of interdependencies that exist in contract); Matthew Jennejohn, The Architecture of
Contract Innovation, 59 B.C. L. REV. 71, 76 (2018). Provisions and agreements comprised of
language are at best relatively discrete. Recognizing this, this Article refers to contracts and
provisions that are relatively facially context independent and/or encapsulated in form
as discrete.
9. Hwang, supra note 6, at 1417–18.
10. See, e.g., Willis Re Inc. v. Herriott, No. 21-CV-487 (JMF), 2021 WL 3204764 (S.D.N.Y.
July 22, 2021).
11. 11.See Hwang, supra note 6, at 1417–18; Smith, Modularity in Contracts, supra note
6, at 1186–96; Triantis, supra note 6, at 204–08; Spencer Williams, Contracts as Systems, 45 DEL.
J. CORP. L. 219 (2021) [hereinafter Williams, Contracts as Systems].
12. See, e.g., ISDA LINKLATERS, WHITEPAPER, supra note 6, at 22 (anticipating a move
toward a modular approach to the ISDA library of definitions to facilitate smart contract
implementation); Triantis, supra note 6, at 191 (identifying “[t]he modularity of contracts [as]
essential to . . . emerging technologies.”); see also Joshua Fairfield, The Cost of Consent: Optimal
Standardization in the Law of Contract, 58 EMORY L.J. 1401, 1453 (2009) (“Contracts have become
increasingly modularized.”); Smith, Modularity in Contracts, supra note 6, at 1179
(“[E]volution—even evolution not directed by a central intelligence—often gravitates
towards modular systems because of their ability to adapt to new conditions. . . . [S]o, the
evolution of contract law and of privately circulating forms of boilerplate can be explained
as the product of a similar evolutionary logic.”) (footnote omitted); cf. Jennejohn, supra
note 8, at 78 (identifying features of “flexible specialization” in addition to modularity in
complex contracts).
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This Article is the first to identify and categorize the risks
introduced by modular design at both the intra-contract level,
among provisions, and the inter-contract level, among discrete
agreements that constitute complex transactions. It analyzes the
largely overlooked qualities of natural language and doctrine that
impact how contracts are understood by parties and courts. In
doing so, the Article demonstrates how this fundamental drafting
approach, celebrated for minimizing uncertainty and drafting
costs, can also introduce new forms of these very risks.
This Article thereby makes a theoretical contribution with
implications for contract innovation and contract doctrine. It shows
how the innovation enabled by modularity can diminish the
certainty of seemingly stable, even standardized, provisions and
contract forms. The porting of provisions into new contexts where
they may operate differently imposes information costs on other
drafters who seek to mix and match precedent provisions and
agreements. And, when the operation of a modular provision in
one contract gets called into question, this can also impact the
operation of similar provisions in other contexts, thereby degrading
the effective operation of the current system of contract generally.
In light of the dynamics it identifies, the Article offers tools for
courts and contract drafters to mitigate the risks modularity can
introduce. In doing so, it also highlights the costs of choice in
contract and intervenes to complicate the discussion around the
optimal balance of standardization and private choice in contracts.
The Article proceeds as follows.
Part I outlines the benefits associated with modular design in
contracts and examines the extent to which contract doctrine allows
for effective modular design. As the thinking goes,
compartmentalization makes learning and drafting easier by
allowing contract drafters to work on one part of a complex
agreement without introducing a cascade of changes in other parts
of the document.13 Compartmentalization also facilitates
innovation by enabling drafters to develop different parts of the
deal documentation simultaneously and allowing specialists to
focus on their area of expertise.14 And, compartmentalization
makes it easier for a drafter to plug in or “port” a relatively
13. Hwang, supra note 6, at 1417–18.
14. Id. at 1419.
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independent provision to a new context, creating new
configurations of provisions.15 The ability to mix and match
provisions across transactional contexts, which can have differing
approaches and goals, offers additional opportunities for choice
and private ordering.16 Modularity, therefore, “is said to create
options” in an increasingly complex world, while it also “allows a
system to manage uncertainty.”17
The successful operation of modular design, however, depends
on stable rules and building blocks. The interaction among contract
doctrine that aims to treat different contract types differently,
maxims of interpretation, and discrete contract provisions can lead
to competing default rules that increase uncertainty.18 Most
basically, the interaction of discrete provisions and agreements can,
at times, suggest to courts more than one intended operation of
a provision.
Considering this, Part II analyzes the types of contingencies
introduced by modularity in contracts. The Article groups these
contingencies into three categories: First, “intertextualism,” which
occurs when the operation of a discrete, and even standard,
provision seems clear in isolation but is made uncertain by the
15. See Smith, Modularity in Contracts, supra note 6, at 1198 (“Porting is one of the chief
virtues of boilerplate . . . .”); Triantis, supra note 6, at 204–08 (“[M]odular solutions developed
in one context may be valuable in others.”); see also Afra Afsharipour, Transforming the
Allocation of Deal Risk Through Reverse Termination Fees, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1161, 1164 (2010)
(noting the increasing prevalence of reverse termination fee provisions and describing their
development, which epitomizes the process of innovation through modularity).
16. See, e.g., DAGAN & HELLER, supra note 2, at 3, 8 (identifying the “choice among
(contract) types” as “the mainstay of present-day contracting”); Daniel Markovits, Contract
and Collaboration, 113 YALE L.J. 1417, 1419–20 (2004); Schwartz & Scott, supra note 2, at 543–
44 (identifying different transaction categories precipitating different contractual
approaches); see also ERIN A. O’HARA & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE LAW MARKET 8 (2009) (noting
the need to “distinguish business-to-business from business-to-consumer contracts” in
analyzing choice-of-law policy); Ronald J. Gilson, Charles F. Sabel & Robert E. Scott, Text and
Context: Contract Interpretation as Contract Design, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 23, 42 (2014)
(critiquing the “presumption of the unitary nature of contract law” in light of the varied
modes of contract practice); Ethan J. Leib, On Collaboration, Organizations, and Conciliation in
the General Theory of Contract, 24 QLR 1 (2005).
17. Smith, Modularity in Contracts, supra note 6, at 1177 (“[B]ecause each module can
function and develop in relative isolation, these processes can occur without the need to
resolve uncertainty elsewhere in the system.”); see also Hwang & Jennejohn, Deal Structure,
supra note 6, at 280; see generally, Steven L. Schwarcz, Disclosure’s Failure in the Subprime
Mortgage Crisis, 2008 UTAH L. REV. 1109, 1110 (2008) (describing complexity of market).
18. See Tal Kastner & Ethan Leib, Contract Creep, 107 GEO. L.J. 1277, 1310–12 (2019)
(discussing the creep of doctrine across transaction types).
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presence of other discrete provisions in the same agreement or
another related agreement. Second, “modular drift,” which occurs
when drafters transplant provisions specific to one transactional
context into a different type of transaction, introducing uncertainty.
Third, “latent triggers,” which occur when compartmentalization
invites error or obscures a nuance introduced by the interaction
among different discrete provisions. As the Article demonstrates,
these types of risk can also exacerbate one another.
Part III identifies the implications of these risks for courts,
drafters, and contract theory. It urges courts to strengthen existing
doctrinal tools to lessen uncertainty and it offers practice tools to
drafters to mitigate the risks. This Part also illustrates the potential
costs of modular choice to third parties who seek to use existing
provisions or precedents. As facially context-independent
provisions in the market are deployed in new configurations and
in different transaction types, these variations can introduce
information costs and uncertainty as to a provision’s meaning in
each context. This Part thereby identifies an underappreciated
dimension of contract incompleteness19—the contingency of
discrete provisions in relation to each other and to other
agreements—a dimension that must be addressed in developing
applications of complex systems theory and artificial intelligence to
contracts.20 The Article demonstrates the diminished benefits of
standard provisions for future contracting parties in a world
lacking doctrinal boundaries where portable provisions can be
mixed and matched—a source of risk for the system of
contracts overall.
Part IV concludes.
I. THE BENEFITS OF MODULARITY
Modular design has been recognized to confer benefits in
myriad aspects of our world, from organization design to

19. For an overview of scholarship on contract incompleteness, see Robert
Anderson IV, Path Dependence, Information, and Contracting in Business Law and Economics,
2020 WIS. L. REV. 553, 553–54.
20. A developing body of scholarship has come to recognize that contract provisions
operate as part of a greater whole in complex transactions, but it has generally treated contract
modules as stable building blocks. See Hwang, supra note 6; Smith, Modularity in Contracts, supra
note 6; Williams, Contracts as Systems, supra note 11 (surveying this scholarly turn).
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engineering to psychology21—and, of late, to law. Applying
modular design, scholars have offered fresh approaches to
property,22 environmental law,23 torts,24 production and firm
organization,25 antitrust,26 telecommunications and internet
regulation,27 the creation of capital,28 and the relation between
public and private law.29 The practices of swapping out provisions
by different parties in international treaty negotiation,30 the mixing
and matching of forms and optional provisions in insurance

21. See BALDWIN & CLARK, DESIGN RULES, supra note 7, at 63 n.1 (noting the positive
impact of modular design on a range of fields that engage complex systems “from brain
science and psychology, to robotics, artificial intelligence and industrial engineering”);
Smith, Modularity in Contracts, supra note 6, at 1177 ([M]odularity is increasingly employed
in areas ranging from biological evolution to organizational design . . . .”); Yoo, supra note 7,
at 4.
22. See, e.g., Henry E. Smith, Property as the Law of Things, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1691, 1693,
1700–23 (2012) (identifying property law as a modular system encapsulating “lumpy
packages of legal relations” and describing the role of modules in property law in containing
third-party information costs, managing the complexity of land use interactions, and making
property more useful) [hereinafter Smith, Law of Things]; see also Thomas W. Merrill, Property
as Modularity, 125 HARV. L. REV. 151, 151 (2012) (acknowledging modularity as a functional
account of important features of property system); Richard N. Langlois, Modularity in
Technology and Organization, 49 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 19, 19 (2002) (analyzing the
modularity of property and the firm).
23. See Jody Freeman & Daniel A. Farber, Modular Environmental Regulation, 54 DUKE
L.J. 795 (2005) (outlining a “modular ideal” in proposing a conception of environmental
regulation and resource management to address multiple and seemingly incompatible longterm demands).
24. See Henry E. Smith, Modularity and Morality in the Law of Torts, 4 J. TORT L. 1 (2011)
(arguing that tort law mobilizes modules to manage complex interactions between parties).
25. Margaret M. Blair, Erin O’Hara O’Connor & Gregg Kirchhoefer, Outsourcing,
Modularity, and the Theory of the Firm, 2011 BYU L. REV. 263, 265 (2011) (identifying the
modularization of production processes as illuminating outsourcing relationships); Langlois,
supra note 22.
26. Joseph Farrell & Philip J. Weiser, Modularity, Vertical Integration, and Open Access Policies:
Towards a Convergence of Antitrust and Regulation in the Internet Age, 17 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 85, 89
(2003) (advocating for a model of platform regulation that accounts for modular operation).
27. See Yoo, supra note 7, at 40–42.
28. See KATHARINA PISTOR, THE CODE OF CAPITAL: HOW THE LAW CREATES WEALTH
AND INEQUALITY 3 (2019) (identifying “contract law, property rights, collateral law, trust,
corporate, and bankruptcy law” as “the modules from which capital is coded”).
29. See Smith, Law of Things, supra note 22, at 1723–25; Andrew S. Gold & Henry E.
Smith, Sizing Up Private Law , 70 UNIV. TORONTO L.J. 489, 489 (2020).
30. See Kenneth J. Vandevelde, The Bilateral Investment Treaty Program of the United
States, 21 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 201, 211 (1988) (describing treaty negotiations proceeding from
model form of which discrete provisions would be modified).
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policies31 and in construction contracts32 illustrate applications of
modular contract design. Even more starkly, the structure of
over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives contracts33 and the developing
field of computable contract terms34 reflect modular contract
design structures.
This Article does not dispute the potential benefits of modular
design. But, given the use of compartmentalization as a longstanding
drafting tool, this Article highlights the underappreciated
limitations and tradeoffs of its use in contracts, especially
considering developing technologies and an increasingly complex
landscape. Before doing so, this Part outlines the benefits attributed
to modular contract design and the doctrinal context in which
it operates.
A. Limiting Costs and Enabling Innovation Through Modular Design
Human beings are known to be “limited in their ability to learn,
think, and act,” especially when facing complex issues involving
many interacting parts.35 Complexity makes it hard to understand
any aspect of a system because of interdependencies of parts. The
presence of many interconnections can also make it difficult to
work on a complex structure because a change to one part prompts
31. See, e.g., Ramara, Inc. v. Westfield Ins. Co., 814 F.3d 660 (3d Cir. 2016) (construing
meaning of terms considering ambiguity caused by interaction of master insurance
agreement and “endorsements,” or supplemental modular provisions taken from models
developed in different years); see generally KENNETH S. ABRAHAM & DANIEL SCHWARCZ,
INSURANCE LAW AND REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 37 (6th ed. 2015).
32. See, e.g., Robinhorne Constr. Corp. v. Snyder, 265 N.E.2d 670 (Ill. 1970)
(considering intended meaning of contract constituted by American Institute of Architects
form contract and attached riders and conditions); see also Carl J. Circo, Building a Better
Construction and Design Contract (with Sample Provisions), 46 PRAC. LAW 21 (2000).
33. See Norman Menachem Feder, Market in the Remaking: Over-the-Counter Derivatives
in a New Age, 11 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 309, 341–42 (2017) (describing the “modular”
“architecture” developed for the over-the-counter derivatives market by the International
Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) involving a standard-form master agreement
governing all trades between signatory parties, which can be modified and “import by
reference other publications released by ISDA”).
34. See ISDA LINKLATERS, WHITEPAPER, supra note 6, at 22 (envisioning a modular
ISDA library of individual definitions concerning the growing range of derivatives, which
could be combined for an individual transaction).
35. BALDWIN & CLARK, DESIGN RULES, supra note 7, at 5. A complex system is
“characterized by a large number of internal interactions . . . .” See Smith, Modularity in
Contracts, supra note 6, at 1180; HERBERT A. SIMON, THE SCIENCES OF THE ARTIFICIAL 183–84
(3d ed. 1996).
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cascading changes throughout the system. As one evocative
description of modularity put it, “breaking up a complex system
into discrete pieces” that interact with each other in standardized
ways in a standardized framework serves to “eliminate what
would otherwise be an unmanageable spaghetti tangle of
systemic interconnections.”36
To illustrate the benefits of modular design, Herbert Simon, a
Nobel Prize winning economist and pioneer in the study of
complexity, offered a “parable” of modularity.37 He described two
watchmakers whose intricate products consist of about 1,000 parts
and are in high demand. One watchmaker succeeds in managing
increasing orders by constructing the watches out of stable
“subassemblies of about ten elements each.”38 This way, when
callers placing orders for more watches interrupt the watchmaker
mid-assembly, the work does not entirely fall to pieces.39 In
contrast, a competitor watchmaker’s business is failing. The
struggling watchmaker’s watch is made of wholly interconnected
pieces. Each time this watchmaker is interrupted by an order for
another watch, the work falls apart, and the watchmaker must start
from scratch.40
As the parable illustrates, modular design reduces complexity
by containing intense interdependencies within a module and
creating limited connections between modules.41 This design
feature thereby enables mastery of components that can be
comprehended and assembled in chunks. Simple visible
connections between components facilitate production and
understanding of the whole. Moreover, compartmentalization
enables specialization and the development of components, which
in turn, further innovation.42

36. Langlois, supra note 22, at 19.
37. SIMON, supra note 35, at 188; see also Smith, Modularity in Contracts, supra note 6, at
1180 (citing Simon’s example).
38. SIMON, supra note 35, at 188.
39. Id.
40. Id.; see also Langlois, supra note 22, at 21 (noting that in a “decomposable system,”
“the proper working of a given part will depend . . . on the characteristics of the other parts
within its subassembly . . . [but less so on those] outside of that subassembly. . . . [So it] may
be able to limp along even if some subsystems are damaged or incomplete.”).
41. See Smith, Modularity in Contracts, supra note 6, at 1182–84.
42. SIMON, supra note 35, at 188–89.
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Scholars have applied the metaphor of the watchmaker to view
common “boilerplate” provisions as exemplifying the potential for
contract terms to be encapsulated so that they can be easily moved
or altered.43 Other scholarship points to “modules of terms,” such
as closing conditions and dispute resolution provisions present in
“[m]any business contracts,” as potentially conferring the benefits
of modular design.44
Most basically, scholars have suggested that hiving off parts in
self-contained sections can reduce reading and learning costs.
Encapsulation can reduce drafting costs by enabling a modular
provision to be easily “ported” in, swapped out, or altered without
precipitating a cascade of changes in the documentation.
Encapsulation also has the potential to promote standardization
and with it network and learning benefits. As a term is used over
time and proliferates, the thinking goes, uncertainty about its
meaning and operation can be diminished through interpretive
precedent and refinement.45 Thus, facially discrete provisions can,
though they need not, become standardized, or boilerplate, terms
just as Lego parts can take the form of either standard or
idiosyncratic building blocks that connect with others through a
standardized visible mode of interaction.46
A number of drafting conventions promote modular contract
design. The avoidance of cross references, a “cardinal rule[]” of
43. Smith, Modularity in Contracts, supra note 6, at 1191 (characterizing common
“provisions that typically are found at the end of a contract and deal with recurring matters
like assignment and delegation, successors and assigns, third-party beneficiaries, governing
law and forum selection, waiver of jury trial, arbitration, remedies, indemnities, force
majeure, transaction costs, confidentiality, announcements and notices, amendment and
waiver, severability, merger, and captions” as reflecting “a high degree of modularity”); see
also Margaret Jane Radin, Boilerplate Today: The Rise of Modularity and the Waning of Consent,
104 MICH. L. REV. 1223, 1224 (2006) (identifying standard portable terms as building blocks
that can be used to customize a more complex system).
44. Triantis, supra note 6, at 181.
45. See Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Standardization and Innovation in Corporate
Contracting (Or “The Economics of Boilerplate”), 83 VA. L. REV. 713, 719–20, 730–34 (1997).
Learning benefits result over time, while network benefits result from broad usage at a point
in time. See id.
46. See, e.g., Chicago Bridge & Iron Co. N.V. v. Westinghouse Elec. Co., 166 A.3d 912
(Del. 2017) (examining the interaction of a tailored arbitration provision with an
indemnification provision); see also Robert Anderson & Jeffrey Manns, Boiling Down
Boilerplate in M&A Agreements: A Response to Choi, Gulati, & Scott, 67 DUKE L.J. ONLINE 219,
230 (2019) [hereinafter Anderson & Manns, Boiling Down Boilerplate] (analyzing distinctions
in boilerplate M&A provisions).
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contract drafting, reflects an intuitive recognition of the design
benefit of a modular structure.47 Severability clauses provide that,
in the event a provision is invalidated or unenforceable, the
remaining terms constitute the contract.48 They thereby suggest that
provisions can be swapped out without undoing the structure as a
whole.49 Defined terms also enable modular design within an
agreement. They contain the meaning of recurring terms so that
changes can be made to a definition without necessarily prompting
the reworking of the contract.50 Definitions thereby prove
invaluable in facilitating drafting and negotiation. Moreover, by
limiting an agreement’s dependence on context, definitions enable
the agreement to function as a modular component in
a transaction.51
Thus, scholars have noted benefits of compartmentalization not
only at the level of the provision, but also at the level of discrete
agreements that serve as building blocks of a complex deal.52 For
example, complex M&A transactions typically involve not only an
acquisition agreement, governing the terms of an asset purchase,
stock purchase, or merger, but also a number of additional
“ancillary” deal documents.53 Separate documented agreements
can facilitate deal design, much in the way that discrete provisions
can—by promoting division of labor54 and an increased rate of
learning and innovation.55 To the extent that agreements or
provisions are modular—so that most of the interconnection
among provisions is contained within them—they allow specialists
in certain areas, such as employment, tax, or antitrust, to focus on
those areas of the deal documents that pertain to their area of
expertise. Discrete agreements can also reduce unnecessary
interdependencies by separating parties involved in different
47. Smith, Modularity in Contract, supra note 6, at 1189.
48. See 15 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
CONTRACTS § 45:6 (4th ed. 2021).
49. But see Jennejohn, supra note 8, at 129–30 (highlighting the difficulty of hiving off a
provision without altering the contract as suggested by the wording of severability clauses).
50. See Smith, Modularity in Contracts, supra note 6, at 1190.
51. Id.
52. See Hwang, supra note 6, at 1424–25.
53. Id. at 1425.
54. See Yoo, supra note 7, at 20.
55. See Carliss Y. Baldwin & Kim B. Clark, Managing in an Age of Modularity, HARV.
BUS. REV. (Sept.–Oct. 1997), https://hbr.org/1997/09/managing-in-an-age-of-modularity.
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aspects of a deal or carving out risk, among other ways.56 And, in a
deal built out of discrete related agreements, parties must only
review and sign on to the aspects of a transaction in which they are
involved.57 Firms thereby implement modular contract design to
maximize practitioner knowledge and cost savings for the client.58
In light of all this, modularity has been seen as a way to avoid
the tradeoff between the learning and network benefits of
standardization, on one hand, and standardization’s chilling effect
on innovation, on the other.59 Relatively self-contained modules,
scholars suggest, not only make possible a “decentralized, parallel
and asynchronous” process of development,60 but create
opportunities for the relocation of terms into new contexts and thus
possibilities for innovation.61 Thus, modularity has been touted for
“reduc[ing] the costs of reading and understanding” terms, which
“thereby facilitates the adoption of a novel provision because
it can be incorporated in documents without disturbing the
other provisions.”62
Pointing to these benefits, scholars regularly analogize to
computer programming and coding as a framework for contract
design.63 Technology is advancing to bring more aspects
of contracting within the reach of automation,64 and machine

56. See Hwang, supra note 6, at 1427–32. Opinion letters on the fairness or anticipated
regulatory treatment of the deal or voting agreements to support the deal are other examples.
See id. at 1416.
57. See id.
58. See id. at 1419.
59. See Triantis, supra note 6, at 182.
60. Id. at 204.
61. See BALDWIN & CLARK, DESIGN RULES, supra note 7, at 140.
62. Triantis, supra note 6, at 191.
63. See, e.g., Erik F. Gerding, Contract as Pattern Language, 88 WASH. L. REV. 1323, 1323–
25 (2013) (discussing the intersection of two dominant metaphorical frameworks for
contract—architecture and computer code and identifying “pattern language,” as an
“encapsulated abstract or conceptual solution to a recurring design problem[]” as a link
between the two); see also Hwang, supra note 6, at 1422; Smith, Modularity in Contracts, supra
note 6, at 1177 (drawing “an analogy between writing contracts and writing computer
programs”); Triantis, supra note 6, at 204–05; Spencer Williams, Predictive Contracting, 2019
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 621 [hereinafter Williams, Predictive Contracting]. But see Anderson, supra
note 19, at 566–68 (suggesting an “evolutionary metaphor”).
64. See, e.g., Williams, Predictive Contracting, supra note 63, at 629–30 (considering how
machine learning could enable parties to predict likely outcomes from contract terms to
facilitate the balancing of front and back-end costs).
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learning offers opportunities to better understand and develop
complex systems.65
At present, however, a significant gap remains between what
computer language and contract documents can yet accomplish.66
For example, electronic forms do not allow for strategic vagueness
or enforcement discretion, which can create significant efficiencies
in the process of contracting.67 Not only do some types of clauses
“prove more resistant to automation,” others precipitate complex
analysis such that, in these cases, “it is never efficient or desirable
to automate these parts of the contract, even if it were technically
possible . . . .”68 Modular terms and automatable terms are not
necessarily coextensive categories. And even relatively modular
automatable terms, including those in blockchain-enabled
transactions, depend on natural language to establish their
contractual framework.69 In addition, contracts, of course, are not
entirely modular, and the degree of modularity of subparts
may vary.70
Nonetheless, the concept of modular design has proved
significant to the design and management of complex structures.
And, while natural language is not the same as computer code,
parties to and drafters of contracts often aim to achieve the benefits
of compartmentalization.
65. See Williams, Contracts as Systems, supra note 11, at 234.
66. See Surden, supra note 6, at 640; see also Frank Pasquale, A Rule of Persons, Not
Machines: The Limits of Legal Automation, 87 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 23–25 (2019) (noting the
benefits of code-based transactions in simple supply chain contracts but also the
“formidable” design costs of programming fair dispute resolutions and verifications of
factual predicates for automated contracts); Kevin Werbach & Nicolas Cornell, Contracts Ex
Machina, 67 DUKE L.J. 313, 365 (2017) (acknowledging the limits of machine readable code to
“subjects and activities that can readily be specified,” as opposed to legal or industry
standards like “best efforts” and identifying the ways in which “smart contracts” fail to
displace a number of functions of contract law).
67. See Jeremy M. Sklaroff, Smart Contracts and the Cost of Inflexibility, 166 U. PA L. REV.
263, 291–300 (2016); see also Albert Choi & George Triantis, Strategic Vagueness in Contract
Design: The Case of Corporate Acquisitions, 119 YALE L.J. 848 (2010) (analyzing the value of the
screening function of vague material adverse change terms).
68. ISDA LEGAL GUIDELINES FOR SMART DERIVATIVES CONTRACTS: INTRODUCTION 1012 (2019), https://www.isda.org/a/MhgME/Legal-Guidelines-for-Smart-DerivativesContracts-Introduction.pdf; see also Pasquale, supra note 66, at 25–27 (describing complaints
by banks about the costliness of translating asset-backed securities into code).
69. See Shaanan Cohney & David A. Hoffman, Transactional Scripts in Contract Stacks,
105 MINN. L. REV. 319, 385 (2020).
70. See Jennejohn, supra note 8, at 73 (identifying more “infra-transactional
complexity” than expected in merger agreements).
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The successful operation of modular design, however, depends
on stable rules. As the next section briefly outlines, the interaction
among contract doctrine, principles of construction, and facially
context-independent contract provisions and agreements can lead
to competing default rules—or a lack of default rule—thereby
introducing uncertainty.
B. Rules Governing Contract Inputs and Interactions of Parts
To operate predictably, a modular system ideally involves the
establishment of certain types of reliable rules. These include rules
identifying the bounds of the system and boundaries between
parts, or what design theorists call the architecture; and rules as to
how the parts will plug in or interact with each other, or interfaces.71
As part of the architecture and interfaces of contracts, contract
doctrine aims to provide predictable rules. It does so because, for
the most part, contract doctrine seeks to privilege the expressed
intentions of the parties,72 viewing the parties as best suited to
determine their welfare-enhancing arrangements.73
To maintain predictability at the level of the text, contracts are
subject to principles of contract construction. These “oft cited
standards of interpretation” include the maxims that “the specific
controls the general; the contract is to be considered as a whole; if
possible, all the provisions of the contract should be given effect.”74
Yet contract scholars question the reliability of these principles in
practice.75 Moreover, the application of each principle can hinge not
only on other principles but on the interaction of contract
provisions with each other, with context, and with the doctrine.
More basically, by virtue of the “infinite number of possible
future states,” contracts are recognized as inevitably incomplete.76
Thus, by engaging a medium of contractual expression, whether a
handshake arrangement or a document, parties and drafters invoke
71. BALDWIN & CLARK, DESIGN RULES, supra note 7, at 77.
72. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co. v. Swift Distrib., Inc., 326 P.3d 253, 259 (Cal. 2014);
Greenfield v. Philles Recs., Inc., 780 N.E.2d 166, 170 (N.Y. 2002).
73. See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 2, at 618.
74. J.E. Faltin Motor Transp., Inc. v. Eazor Express, Inc., 273 F.2d 444, 445 (3d Cir. 1959)
(footnotes omitted).
75. See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH ET AL., CONTRACTS CASES AND MATERIALS 529 (9th
ed. 2019).
76. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 2, at 594–95.
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a larger structure of contract law.77 Courts must revert to the
background of mandatory and default rules when a contract is silent.78
The way in which courts do so, however, depends on their assessment
of the appropriate doctrinal regime and interpretive framework.79
The determination of the appropriate doctrinal regime can at
times itself be open to question. Courts tend to apply certain rules,
such as the parol evidence rule, differently depending on the
transaction type.80 However, the boundaries between types of
transactions are not always clear. For example, scholars disagree
on, and courts have yet to articulate criteria by which to define the
category of sophisticated parties, on which the question of
transaction type turns.81
Moreover, doctrine designed for one transaction type tends to
“creep” or migrate across already blurry boundaries, at times
undermining the predictability of background rules.82 As a recent
study demonstrates, “doctrine that looks bespoke for one
contractual context often ends up as general contract law—and
terms built for specialized transaction types can also jump off track
and into less appropriate transactional environments.”83
And, of course, the parties’ manifested intent in the form of
explicit contract provisions also impacts the application of default
rules. Thus, the architecture of a contract is to some extent
embedded in its parts as well as a court’s determination of context.
Similarly, interfaces—the rules governing the relation between
parts—not only can be found in contract provisions but can be
shaped by the context of a transaction and the background rules.
77. Randy E. Barnett, Consenting to Form Contracts, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 627, 644 (2002)
(arguing that contract law operates as “one big form contract” in the background governing
transactions between parties); see also Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Limits of
Expanded Choice: An Analysis of the Interactions Between Express and Implied Contract Terms, 73
CALIF. L. REV. 261, 261 (1985) (“[T]he state’s general rules of contract provide a set of standard
gap-filling assumptions or implied terms . . . .”).
78. See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic
Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 87 (1989).
79. See Gilson et al., supra note 16, at 28 (noting a wide range of interpretive regimes
that would best determine the “mix of text and context in the particular case”).
80. See id. at 26–27 (describing the conventional understanding of two approaches to
the rule, each of which posits a different prototypical transaction type).
81. Meredith R. Miller, Contract Law, Party Sophistication and the New Formalism, 75 MO.
L. REV. 493, 519–26 (2010) [hereinafter Miller, Party Sophistication].
82. Kastner & Leib, supra note 18, 1304–10 (discussing “category instability”).
83. Id. at 1280.
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At the very least, though not always perfectly predictable, a
number of doctrinal principles attend to the relationship among
parts within a given agreement. However, as things get a bit more
complex, few explicit rules govern the interaction of separate
agreements and provisions.
One exception, a recent proposal, recognizes the need to
account for the ways parties use modularity—or fail to—in their
deal design.84 This approach suggests that courts should conduct a
“first–step inquiry” of whether a deal’s structure is “modular,
integrated, or a hybrid mixture” and treat modular contract
structures with a textualist approach, focusing on the plain
meaning of the terms.85 Along similar lines, recent scholarship
advocates for the application of systems theory to complex
contracts to lend additional granularity to a map of a deal’s
structure.86 Notwithstanding the importance of these insights, as
the discussion in the next Part suggests, a basic interpretive
question remains—how the contractual building blocks in the form
of discrete agreements and provisions can at times, by virtue of
their context independence, invite more than one understanding of
the deal structure intended by parties.87 To the extent that the
contract text is silent about how provisions are intended to relate to
each other, this could also complicate the application of machine
learning to predict intent. As such, even a textualist approach
can lead to uncertainty and, at times, modular contractual
arrangements invite ambiguity. In addition, as discussed in the
next Part, in discerning the transaction structure, courts sometimes
84. Hwang & Jennejohn, Deal Structure, supra note 6, at 292–97.
85. Id. at 325–30.
86. See Williams, Contracts as Systems, supra note 11.
87. A Delaware Court of Chancery case, CA, Inc. v. Ingres Corp., No. 4300-VCS, 2009
WL 4575009 (Del. Ch. 2009), discussed in Hwang & Jennejohn, Deal Structure, supra note 6, at
326, illustrates potential limitations of modular design in helping parties avoid courts’
refashioning the terms of a deal. This case involved a spinoff of Ingres Corp. from CA Inc.
governed by several agreements, which prompted the question of whether a later contract
had renegotiated the terms of an earlier one. Id. at *29–33. The earlier agreement contained a
forum selection provision and a New York choice-of-law provision, but a later agreement
was silent on forum selection with a California choice-of-law provision. Id. at *46. Given the
ambiguous relation of the parts, the competing configurations suggested by these modular
provisions and agreements only further invited extrinsic evidence. See id. at *46–47. Thus,
while the interconnected structure contributed to the introduction of extrinsic evidence, the
interaction of relatively discrete building blocks furthered the ambiguity rather than
mitigated it. See id. at *46 (noting that the forum selection issue implicated the scope of the
integration clause in the later agreement).
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consider a number of deal documents. A court’s view of the
interaction of provisions can be shaped by its understanding of the
substantive goals of a deal. This approach leaves this determination
to courts, who might not be best situated to discern intent from the
text alone, especially in cases of complex or innovative transactions.
This Part has presented the benefits attributed to modular
design and the contingency of the framework in which modular
contract design operates. Through case studies, the next Part
identifies categories of risk introduced by modular contract design
against the backdrop of existing contract doctrine.
II. MODULAR CONTRACT RISKS
As discussed in the preceding Part, the building blocks of a
contract exhibit some characteristics of other forms of modular
design. However, contract doctrine at times fails to establish
reliable rules governing the architecture of a transaction, relevant
inputs, and the interrelation of contract parts. This Part shows how
modular design in contract—a product of language, operating in a
context of sometimes unstable rules—can introduce additional
dimensions of contingency and undermine the goal of effectuating
private ordering.
Fundamentally, while modularity in the realm of computer and
product design has been recognized to “yield[] substantial
benefits,” it is also recognized as “one of the chief villains in
attempting to obtain good performance.”88 Implicit tradeoffs of
modularity include significant up-front costs of design, which can
reify structures and impinge on choice and tailoring in the long
term. In addition, modular design invites a lack of coordination
between encapsulated parts, suppresses details, and introduces
costs to overall precision resulting from a focus on components
rather than the whole.89
Considering these tradeoffs and the operation of contract terms
in practice, this Part identifies three related and mutually
exacerbating categories of modular design risk in contracts. First, it
identifies intertextualism, which occurs when the operation of a
discrete, and even standard, provision seems clear in isolation but
88. Yoo, supra note 7, at 25 (quoting David D. Clark, Modularity and Efficiency in
Protocol Implementation 1 (Request for Comments 817, July 1982)).
89. Id. at 25.
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is made uncertain by the presence of other discrete provisions in
the same agreement or another related agreement. Second, modular
drift, which occurs when drafters transplant provisions specific to
one transactional context into a different type of contract or
transaction, introducing uncertainty. And third, latent triggers,
which occur when compartmentalization invites error or obscures
a nuance introduced by the interaction among discrete provisions.
A. Intertextualism
Modular design aims to enable the management of complexity
by “splitting a system into relatively autonomous components.”90
It involves an upfront investment in design choices, including
determining the overall architecture and the fault lines between
parts.91 This precondition is implicit in the parable of the
watchmaker, which takes for granted that everyone recognizes that
it is a watch being constructed, and that the parts effectively break
down into subsections and “siz[e] up” again into a watch.92
Moreover, modular design envisions stable parts operating
predictably in relation to other parts.
As this section illustrates, however, when contracts are drafted
using discrete provisions, they can at times plausibly be read to
relate to each other in more than one way.93 Some courts invoke the
“one contract” principle to construe contemporaneous agreements
together. As the following discussion shows, this principle as
currently applied leaves open questions about the intended
structure and meaning of the terms.
1. One contract or more? Finding the fault lines
For contracts to operate effectively, courts and parties must be
able to reliably identify the intended relationship of the parts: “The
90. Smith, Modularity in Contracts, supra note 6, at 1196.
91. See BALDWIN & CLARK, DESIGN RULES, supra note 7, at 22.
92. See Gold & Smith, supra note 29, at 501–02 (exploring modularity in private law
theory to account for the “sizing up” of the micro level of individual interaction to the macro
level of society).
93. Cf. Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747 (1999) (proposing
intratextualism as an interpretive approach through which words in the Constitution are
interpreted considering their operation elsewhere within the document); see generally
WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR., INTERPRETING LAW 85–138 (2016) (discussing harmonization of
meaning within a statute as a canon of statutory interpretation).
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trick is to find the natural fault lines in a problem.”94 However, at
times, once the contract is drafted, the relationship between parts
can suggest more than one possible set of fault lines. The fact that,
even minutes after being executed, contracts can be susceptible to
different interpretations is not news for contract theory or practice.
Just as language cannot make unequivocally plain its relation to
itself,95 in contracts, the intended relation between parts and
dividing lines can at times remain uncertain.96
Compartmentalization and limited connections between
contract parts—a feature of modular design—can precipitate
questions about the intended interaction of parts. Thus, identifying
the intended fault lines is not necessarily a simple undertaking,
especially in complex configurations. Moreover, as noted in
Part I.B, the boundaries between doctrinal regimes for different
contract types do not always prove stable or entirely predictable,
complicating matters when the transaction type is not clear and/or
the default rules and principles of construction differ depending on
the type.97 Modular contract design does not necessarily manifest
to drafters and courts the rules that govern how the parts of deal
should connect and which inputs should be considered. In fact, it
can prompt these questions, especially as things get more complex.
By way of a simple example, consider a case in which a person
buys a car from a car dealership by signing an installment contract
that includes a merger provision that “this writing” is the
“complete and exclusive statement of the agreement of the parties”
with respect to financing.98 At the same time, the purchaser is also
handed a “pile of documents” to sign, which includes an agreement

94. Smith, Modularity in Contracts, supra note 6, at 1196.
95. See WILLIAM EMPSON, SEVEN TYPES OF AMBIGUITY 5 (1947); LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN,
PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS (G.E.M. Anscombe trans., Basil Blackwell Ltd. 1953).
96. See Hwang, supra note 6, at 1409 (“Both courts and parties routinely underestimate
the boundaries of deals”).
97. Kastner & Leib, supra note 18, at 1287–1303.
98. See Johnson ex rel. Johnson v. JF Enters., LLC, 400 S.W.3d 763, 765 (Mo. 2013). In
this case, the provision stated, “To protect you (borrower(s)) and us (creditor) from
misunderstanding or disappointment, any agreements we reach covering [the sale and
financing] are contained in this writing, which is the complete and exclusive statement of the
agreement between us, except as we may later agree in writing to modify it.” Id. The
purchaser claimed to have acted on reassurances that she could rely on advertising
promising that most of the loan amount on a new vehicle would be paid by the dealership
but was ultimately told she was responsible for the entire loan amount. Id.
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to arbitrate disputes between the parties.99 When a dispute arises
about the terms of the financing under the installment contract,
how do courts discern the terms of the installment agreement
between the parties? Specifically, how do courts view the
relationship between the merger provision in the installment
contract, on one hand, and the other agreements, on the other?
In such a case, courts go back and forth mobilizing different
principles of construction that key off the significance of these
apparently modular forms—at the levels of both the agreement and
the provision. In holding that the separate arbitration agreement
governed the transaction as a whole, the Missouri Supreme Court
privileged a “one contract” rule, according to which instruments
related to the same subject executed at the same time “will be
construed together, even in the absence of explicit incorporation,
unless ‘the realities of the situation’ indicate that the parties did not
so intend.”100 In doing so, the Missouri Supreme Court reversed the
lower court and abrogated precedent, which had held the same
merger provision to preclude enforcement of a separate arbitration
addendum.101 The Missouri Supreme Court viewed the fact that
“[t]he installment contract does not refer to . . . any of [the] other
documents[,]” which included the arbitration agreement, a sales
agreement, and legally required disclosures, to indicate
incorporation of the additional documents.102
Notably, the Missouri Supreme Court pointed to the same
modular configuration as the lower court in justifying the opposite
outcome. Precisely because the installment agreement did “not
refer to or incorporate the arbitration agreement and contains a
merger clause stating that it contains the parties’ entire agreement
as to financing,” the lower court held the agreements were to be

99. See id.
100. Id. at 767 (quoting Martin v. U.S. Fid. Corp., 996 S.W.2d 506, 510–11 (Mo. 1999) (en
banc)); see Wells Fargo Bank Minn. v. CD Video, Inc., No. 603790–2002, 6 Misc. 2d 1003(A) at
*6 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2004) (noting that “the rule . . . applies where one contract does not refer in
terms to the other, or even where in one of the contracts it [states] that there are no other
contracts between the parties”).
101. Johnson, 400 S.W.3d at 764, 766 (abrogating Krueger v. Heartland Chevrolet, Inc.,
289 S.W.3d 637 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009)).
102. Id. at 767.
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understood as separate.103 To the extent courts establish a particular
fact-based approach, the absence of an articulated rule that
accounts for the relation between discrete contract parts, including
discrete but related agreements, leaves open the question of where
courts would look for guidance as they view other or more
complex deals.
In addition, this case illustrates how the question of doctrinal
regime can come into play in determining the intended relation of
the modular parts. The dissenting opinion to the Missouri Supreme
Court’s holding in this case is shaped by the judges’ view of the
transaction type. Viewing the transaction as a purchase involving a
consumer and a car dealer offering take-it-or-leave-it terms, the
dissenting judges apply doctrine associated with contracts of
adhesion. In this light, the dissenting judges see a conflict between
the provisions as an ambiguity that must be construed against the
drafter.104 Thus, when there is a question of which doctrinal regime
governs a transaction (here, for example, should the transaction be
treated as a consumer contract of adhesion or an ordinary business
deal?), this uncertainty can invite competing default rules about the
relationship between discrete provisions or agreements.
Even when there is no question of the appropriate doctrinal
regime, courts do not articulate consistent rules about the relation
of discrete contractual parts. The “one contract” rule discussed
above in which courts consider “all writings forming part of the
same transaction”105 invites courts to surmise the nature of the
transaction. One court described the application of this principle
under New York law, a textualist jurisdiction that aims to apply a
strict parol evidence rule, as follows:

103. Id. at 764; cf. Sullivan v. Protex Weatherproofing, Inc., 913 So. 2d 256, 261 (Miss.
2005) (holding that sale of assets under Purchase Agreement and separate Employment
Agreement constituted one “global transaction” despite lack of integration provision that
explicitly incorporated both documents into a single agreement); Sullivan v. Protex
Weatherproofing, Inc., 913 So. 2d 256, 261 (Miss. 2005) (Randolph, J., dissenting) (pointing to
“clear and unambiguous entire agreement clauses that . . . fail to refer to or incorporate any
other agreement” among other provisions as indications that the agreements were intended
as separate).
104. Johnson, 400 S.W.3d at 769–70 (Teitelman, C.J., dissenting); see also Kastner & Leib, supra
note 18, at 1298–02 (outlining the history and application of the principle of contra proferentem).
105. Arizona Structures Worldwide, LLC v. Glob. Blue Techs.-Cameron, LLC, 481
S.W.3d 542, 547 (Mo. Ct. App. 2015) (quoting Osage Water Co. v. Golden Glade Land Owners
Ass’n, 270 S.W.3d 459, 463 (Mo. Ct. App. 2008)).
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This principle [that all writings that form part of a single
transaction may be read together] allows courts to read several
contracts together, even when they do not refer to each other and
are between different parties. However, the ability of courts to
broadly read contracts together is always conditioned upon the
intent of the contracting parties . . . .
New York courts look to many factors, including the form of the
contracts, the parties’ behavior, and the effect of each contract on
the other when determining whether the separate documents
should be read together.106

Courts vary in how they apply the “one contract” principle.107
The benefits of a strict textualist rule hinging, for example, on the
parties to the transaction would be somewhat akin to those
touted in connection with a strict parol evidence rule. Even if
courts do not get a rule exactly right, some argue, a reliable rule
enables sophisticated parties to weigh the costs of expressing
their intentions.108
A strict textualist approach, however, still leaves it up to courts
to determine the nature of the transaction and how the components
were intended to relate.109 At times, when deals are structured to
take advantage of the very benefits of modular design by including
different parties as signatories to different aspects of the deal,110
judges split on which modular features reflect the intended
agreement and how.111
106. Grandis Fam. P’ship v. Hess Corp., 588 F. Supp. 2d 1319, 1332–33 (S.D. Fla. 2008)
(citations omitted).
107. See Applehead Pictures LLC v. Perelman, 80 A.D.3d 181, 188–89 (N.Y. App. Div.
2010) (finding operating agreement and separation agreement entered into on the same day
by different parties not intended to be interdependent); Kramer v. William F. Murphy SelfDeclaration of Tr., 816 N.W.2d 813, 815 (S.D. 2012) (construing disbursement agreement,
loan agreement, and promissory notes as a single contract despite the parties to each not
being identical).
108. See Gilson et al., supra note 16, at 27–28 (describing the textualist approach).
109. See Applehead Pictures, 80 A.D.3d at 189 (“[S]eparate written agreements involving
different parties, serving different purposes and not referring to each other are not intended
to be interdependent or somehow combined to form a unitary contract . . . in the absence of
some clear indication that the parties had a contrary intention, contracts manifesting separate
assents to be bound are generally presumed to be separable.”).
110. See Hwang, supra note 6, at 1428 (“Parties may prefer using separate ancillary
agreements for party-specific issues to reduce both front- and back-end deal costs.”).
111. See, e.g., Kramer 816 N.W.2d at 814 (holding that a loan agreement with promissory
notes containing forum selection provisions and a concurrently executed disbursement
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Not only can discrete forms suggest more than one intended
relation among provisions and agreements, but they can also signal
meaning to judges in ways that are attenuated from their
substantive operation. Take, for example, a case involving a
common transactional arrangement in which the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals, applying Illinois law, inferred meaning from the
presence of peripherally related discrete provisions.
In Rosenblum v. Travelbyus.com Ltd., Michael Rosenblum sold his
travel-related business and magazine to Travelbyus.com pursuant
to an Acquisition Agreement.112 On the same day that the parties
entered into the Acquisition Agreement, they also entered into an
Employment Agreement whereby Rosenblum would continue to
work and develop content for the magazine.113 In this way, the
parties effectuated the deal using modular design—an Acquisition
Agreement governed the terms of the sale of the business from
Rosenblum to Travelbyus.com, and an Employment Agreement
governed the terms of Rosenblum’s employment by the company.
These agreements, as is common, also contained a number of
discrete provisions. Each agreement contained a noncompete
provision restricting Rosenblum from working with a competitor
of the company for a period following the sale.114 In addition, the
Employment Agreement contained a broadly drafted arbitration
provision subjecting “any matter in dispute under or relating to this
Agreement” to binding arbitration.115
When a dispute arose between the parties concerning the
payment of the purchase price by Travelbyus.com to Rosenblum
agreement between some but not all the same parties constituted a single contract so that the
forum selection clause governed the disbursement agreement involving other parties). But
see id. at 817–19 (Zinter, J., dissenting) (pointing to the lack of forum selection provision
in the disbursement agreement to “support” the view that the “contract involved
independent obligations and rights” such that “each party was not subject to each term of
each agreement”).
112. Rosenblum v. Travelbyus.com Ltd., 299 F.3d 657, 659–60 (7th Cir. 2002).
113. Id. at 660.
114. Id. at 663.
115. Min. Order at 2, Rosenblum v. Travelbyus, Ltd., No. 01 C 6441, 2002 WL 31487823,
at *1 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 15, 2001), ECF No. 17 [hereinafter Rosenblum Order]. This formulation
itself operates as a module, containing meaning, as it has been construed by courts as
“extremely broad and capable of an expansive reach.” See Kiefer Specialty Flooring, Inc. v.
Tarkett, Inc., 174 F.3d 907, 909 (7th Cir. 1999) (construing language providing that any claims
“arising out of or relating to” the agreements between the parties would be settled by
arbitration as broad).
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pursuant to the Acquisition Agreement, Rosenblum sued.
Travelbyus.com then moved to dismiss, citing the arbitration
provision in the Employment Agreement.116
To determine whether the arbitration provision in the
Employment Agreement was intended to relate only to the terms
of employment or, alternatively, to the broader transaction,
including the acquisition, judges viewed the relationship of the
components of the transaction in different ways. Indeed, even
seemingly unrelated provisions figured into the analysis of the
parties’ intentions.
In this case, the district court viewed the transaction as
contemplating a capacious arbitration provision. It read the broad
formulation of the arbitration provision in the Employment
Agreement to suggest an intent by the parties that the provision
apply to the entire transaction.117 The court viewed other modular
features, such as the merger provision in the Acquisition
Agreement, as consistent with the intent by the parties to enter a
single global transaction.118
In contrast, the court of appeals looked at the contractual
building blocks constituting the transaction and reversed. It held
that the arbitration provision in the Employment Agreement was
not intended to extend to the Acquisition Agreement. Notably, the
court of appeals remarked the inclusion of “substantially similar”
non-compete provisions in each agreement.119 It read the presence
of these building blocks to indicate an intent by the parties to enter
into two “separate, free-standing contracts.”120 Though these
discrete provisions were not directly related to the question of
dispute resolution at issue, the inclusion of a similar discrete
provision in each agreement, according to the court, reflected a
parallel “internal structure” and, thus, an intent by the parties that

116. Rosenblum Order, supra note 115.
117. Id.
118. Id. The district court noted the inclusion of the Employment Agreement in the
“Conditions Precedent” to the Acquisition Agreement and read the merger provision in the
Acquisition Agreement that referred to “agreements and documents to be delivered
pursuant to” the Acquisition Agreement as “constitut[ing] the entire agreement . . .
pertaining to the subject matter,” to express the parties’ intent that the two contracts together
constitute the “Entire Agreement.” Rosenblum v. Travelbyus.com, Ltd., 299 F.3d at 660.
119. Id. at 663.
120. Id.
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each contract be “complete on [its] own.”121 In this light, the court of
appeals read the arbitration and merger provisions narrowly, rejecting
the significance attributed to the provisions by the lower court.122
Thus, rather than clarify the intended relationship between
discrete provisions and related agreements, as this case illustrates,
the presence of discrete provisions and agreements—even those
not substantively related to the question at hand—can introduce
new dimensions of uncertainty about the intended operation of
other discrete provisions. In this way, absent an architecture that
accounts for such interactions, modular design can introduce
uncertainty about the operation of even standard provisions.

***

To a large extent, portable provisions and agreements serve as
valuable manifestations of the parties’ intentions. Yet, discrete
provisions and agreements can together—by virtue of their
“context independent” structures123—invite questions as to both
their intended relation as well as the relevant doctrinal context. As
these examples suggest, the deployment of discrete parts does not
necessarily lead to reliable outputs. Instead, when contracts involve
different levels of discrete parts, these modules can invite more
than one understanding of the whole. Moreover, they can shape the
possible operation of various parts in ways that might not be
predictable or apparent to drafters as they seek to mobilize discrete
forms ex ante.
Courts appear to look ultimately to the substance of the
transaction as they perceive it, an approach that is likely to be most
effective when the parties follow a familiar transaction structure—
though, as Rosenblum and similar cases suggest, even then, the
presence of discrete provisions can contribute to uncertainty. To
reliably discern the parties’ intentions about deal design, judges
may need to draw on extrinsic evidence. Thus, in general, leaving

121. Id.
122. Id. at 664–65. The court emphasized the application of the arbitration provision by
“its terms, to ‘any matter in dispute under or relating to this Agreement.’” Id. at 664. Other
courts split on this fact pattern as well, reversing themselves in different ways. See, e.g.,
Sullivan v. Mounger, 882 So. 2d 129, 135 (Miss. 2004) (reversing lower court to construe
agreements together).
123. Smith, Modularity in Contract, supra note 6, at 1190.

477

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

47:2 (2022)

the determination of parties’ intentions in complex or innovative
cases at the discretion of textualist courts can invite uncertainty.
2. Interacting terms, hidden rules, and changing meanings
In addition to inviting questions about the intended
configuration of a transaction, the interaction of discrete provisions
can invite questions as to their intended meaning even within a
document. For example, a study of forum selection clauses
demonstrates how interactions among highly modular provisions
can change the meaning ascribed to them by courts in ways not
necessarily intended by sophisticated parties.124 While courts tend
to apply forum selection clauses to “closely related” affiliates who
are not signatories to a contract,125 at times courts read the presence
of another highly modular provision, a no-third-party-beneficiary
clause, as precluding the application of the forum selection clause
to these affiliates.126
Although this approach by courts reflects the plain language
reading of the clauses together, the study expresses skepticism
“that the parties foresaw this issue at the time of contracting and
consciously drafted this [no-third-party-beneficiary] clause to limit
the ability of non-signatories to partake of the contract’s forum
selection clause.”127 Instead, this might be best viewed as an
unanticipated interdependency prompted by the inclusion of two
discrete standard provisions.
Depending on how you look at it, in these cases the interface
that governs the relation between the parts is hidden either to the
parties or to the courts. The outputs of the modules can thereby be
124. Coyle, Forum Selection, supra note 3, at 1823–26.
125. Id. at 1821–26.
126. See, e.g., Casville Invs., Ltd. v. Kates, No. 12 Civ. 6968 RA, 2013 WL 3465816, at *6
(S.D.N.Y. July 8, 2013); Pinto Tech. Ventures, L.P. v. Sheldon, 526 S.W.3d 438, 445 (Tex. 2017);
Coyle, Forum Selection, supra note 3, at 1825.
127. Coyle, Forum Selection, supra note 3, at 1826. A related phenomenon can be seen
within modular provisions—as is the case of a choice-of-law provision that establishes that
an agreement “shall be governed by the laws of” a certain state. Depending on the state
specified, courts will understand the intended breadth of the clause differently. Compare
Knieriemen v. Bache Halsey Stuart Shields, Inc., 74 A.D.2d 290, 292–94 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980)
(construing standard choice-of-law provision choosing New York law to apply only to
contract claims) and Nedlloyd Lines B.V. v. Superior Ct., 834 P.2d 1148 (Cal. 1992)
(construing standard choice-of-law provision choosing California law to apply to tort and
statutory claims as well); see generally John F. Coyle, The Canons of Construction for Choice-ofLaw Clauses, 92 WASH. L. REV. 631, 666–77 (2017).
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impacted in unforeseen ways by the presence of other clauses. In
other words, the presence of other discrete—and thus easily
imported—provisions threaten to alter the operation of another
discrete provision. This dynamic thereby introduces uncertainty as
to the operation of discrete, and even standard, provisions.128
In a related vein, the next section examines the uncertainty
introduced by the portability of terms to different transactional
contexts in which they might or might not be construed differently.
B. Modular Drift
This section explores the uncertainty that results from
portability—another fundamental feature of modular design.
Boilerplate need not be modular, and a modular contractual term
can be bespoke, but when a term is relatively discrete and
somewhat standardized, it can become portable. It can migrate to
new contexts—in which the law and/or transaction type might
differ. In this way, portability can facilitate innovation, whether by
introducing a provision whose operation is intended to remain the
same or by introducing a provision that parties intend to operate
differently in a new context. Yet, portable provisions designed to
anticipate future states and allocate risk and responsibility in one
transaction type might not account for the dynamics of a different
transactional context. Alternatively, an intended change in the
operation of a provision in a new context might remain invisible to
courts. The discussion below outlines the potential for uncertainty
that transplanting terms can invite for current and future parties,
especially if doctrinal boundaries are not clear.
1. Like terms in different contexts
Standardized terms can impart value, not least as a result of
learning and network effects.129 Terms that are refined over time
and used broadly have been said to bring with them the benefits of
more certain meaning, “independent of any particular contractual
128. For an analogous way discrete terms introduce uncertainty in jury instructions,
see Shari Seidman Diamond, Beth Murphy & Mary R. Rose, The “Kettleful of Law” in Real Jury
Deliberations: Successes, Failures, and Next Steps, 106 NW. UNIV. L. REV. 1537, 1564–65 (2012)
(showing how juries get confused by discrete instructions that do not on their face explain
their intended connection, if any, to one another). I thank Valerie Hans for calling this to
my attention.
129. See generally Kahan & Klausner, supra note 45.
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context” or specific intentions of the parties.130 Along these lines,
for example, standard provisions in debt agreements, which are
used by “parties in heterogeneous environments who wish to
communicate a shared intent,” have been seen to “embody that
intent in a fixed and reliable formulation whose meaning does not
vary with the nature of the contract or its context.”131 To the extent
the meaning of terms can remain fixed across context, these terms
resemble the building blocks of modular design.
Courts and scholars have acknowledged, however, that
different doctrinal approaches best serve different contract types.132
The effective operation of standard terms thus depends on the
application of appropriate doctrinal principles, which in turn
hinges on the accurate recognition by courts of the transactional
context. This can become an issue when standardized terms are also
modular. Design theorists explain, “porting . . . is invisible. The
architects of the system and designers of other modules do not have
to know that a port has taken place.”133 But effective operation of
the module presupposes it will be imported into a suitable context
and operate as intended.
In the context of comparative law, scholars have critiqued the
possibility of transplanting legal rules from one legal context to
another.134 In this view, although language can migrate, the
meaning of a rule depends on an understanding of the context from
which it arises.135 In contracts, for the most part, drafters and
interpreters begin with the opposite presumption—language can

130. Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati & Robert E. Scott, The Black Hole Problem in Commercial
Boilerplate, 67 DUKE L.J. 1, 4 (2017) [hereinafter Choi, Gulati & Scott, The Black Hole Problem].
131. Id. at 4–5; see also Sharon Steel Corp. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 691 F.2d 1039,
1048 (2d Cir. 1982); Broad v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 642 F.2d 929, 943 (5th Cir. 1981) (“A large
degree of uniformity in the language of debenture indentures is essential to the effective
functioning of the financial markets . . . .”).
132. See, e.g., 29 Holding Corp. v. Diaz, 775 N.Y.S.2d 807, 817 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2004) (“It
is almost axiomatic that commercial leases may and should be governed by a different rule
than residential leases.”); DAGAN & HELLER, supra note 2, at xii (“[E]xisting contract law . . .
offers types that vary widely in their normative structures . . . .”); Gilson et al., supra note 16,
at 76 (advocating distinct interpretive approaches to different transaction types); Schwartz
& Scott, supra note 2, at 543 (referencing the “heterogeneity of contractual contexts” that
prompt differing normative approaches).
133. BALDWIN & CLARK, DESIGN RULES, supra note 4, at 140.
134. See Pierre Legrand, The Impossibility of “Legal Transplants,” 4 MAASTRICHT J. EUR. &
COMP. L. 111, 122 (1997).
135. Id. at 114.
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be imported, if with care. Modular design, it has been argued, can
“facilitate[] the adoption of a novel provision” when the provision
is easily plugged in without disrupting other parts of the
contract.136 Yet, at times, similar provisions in different contexts
operate differently or may be intended to be used in different ways.
By virtue of a provision’s portability, however, distinctions as to
how the same provision might be construed or intended to operate
in a new context are not necessarily evident to parties and courts.
Scholars have established the downsides of courts treating like
terms alike across contexts, including the way that this can
undermine the goals of a particular transaction type. For example,
scholars have discussed in depth the development of inapposite
doctrine concerning arbitration provisions, a paradigmatically
modular form.137 Arbitration provisions establish that parties agree
to submit all or certain disputes to arbitration rather than judicial
review.138 As scholars have outlined, these provisions present
distinctive structural and cognitive challenges for individual
parties in contracting contexts beyond the merchant-to-merchant
realm envisioned by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).139 But the
portability of arbitration provisions has facilitated treatment of like
terms similarly across contexts,140 resulting at times in the failure to
136. Triantis, supra note 6, at 191.
137. See, e.g., MARGARET JANE RADIN, BOILERPLATE: THE FINE PRINT, VANISHING RIGHTS,
AND THE RULE OF LAW (2012); Judith Resnik, Diffusing Disputes: The Public in the Private of
Arbitration, the Private in Courts, and the Erasure of Rights, 124 YALE L.J. 2804 (2015).
138. See Smith, Modularity in Contracts, supra note 6, at 1191 (identifying arbitration as
an example of a contractual provision “characterized by a high degree of modularity”).
139. Federal Arbitration Act, Pub. L. No. 68-401, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (codified as
amended at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–14 (2012)); see, e.g., Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition
and the Limits of Contract, 47 STAN. L. REV. 211, 258 (1995); Russell Korobkin, Bounded
Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1217, 1225–
27 (2003). For a summary of the challenges posed by arbitration provisions for individual
consumers, see Tal Kastner, “I’m Just Some Guy”: Positing and Leveraging Legal Subjectivities in
Consumer Contracts and the Global Market, 23 IND. J. GLOB. L. STUD. 531, 537 (2016).
140. Recent jurisprudence has eroded the doctrinal distinction between transaction
types. See Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983)
(pronouncing a “liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements . . . .”); Mitsubishi
Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628–29 (1985) (enforcing
arbitration provisions against consumers bringing antitrust claims); Rodriguez de Quijas v.
Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 481 (1989) (enforcing arbitration provisions against
investors making securities laws claims); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S.
20, 29 (1991) (enforcing arbitration provisions against employees claiming violations of
federal anti-discrimination statutes); CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665, 669-
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facilitate parties’ intent and undermining the effective functioning
of consumer contracts.141
The infelicity of treating like terms similarly in different
contexts when doing so undermines the goals of a contract type is
not the only cost of modular drift.142 At times, courts recognize
contextual distinctions that would lead to different treatment of
similar forms. Even when courts do so, however, there might not
be visible rules or interfaces to make the intended context clear
and predictable.
By way of illustration, a recent notable Delaware Court of
Chancery decision concerning the construction of material adverse
effect (MAE) provisions in a merger agreement suggests two
possible interpretive frameworks.143 The distinct doctrinal
approaches depend on the intended context of the clause, thereby
inviting uncertainty.
MAE provisions are standard tools to protect parties from a
significant diminishment in the value to be conveyed between
signing and closing the deal.144 Though heavily negotiated, MAE
provisions are typical modules within the structure of a merger
agreement and as such can invite a uniform doctrinal approach.
That said, in Akorn v. Fresenius,145 the Delaware Chancery Court
referenced a suggestion by scholars that courts distinguish between
strategic and financial transactions in assessing the duration of
harm triggering an MAE.146 In doing so, the court acknowledged
the different goals of different types of deals. Strategic transactions

71 (2012) (expanding the FAA to presume all claims arbitrable unless expressly provided
otherwise by Congress).
141. The failure of arbitration provisions to reflect employees’ and consumers’ intent
due to the uniform application of doctrine suggests a market failure in these contexts.
142. I borrow from JL AUSTIN, HOW TO DO THINGS WITH WORDS 16 (2d. ed., 1955)
(labelling an utterance a “misfire” when “the procedure which we purport to invoke is
disallowed or is botched” and labelling an utterance an “abuse” when the conventional
result of the utterance “is achieved, although to achieve it in [the] circumstances” is not an
appropriate application of the procedure).
143. See Akorn, Inc. v. Fresenius Kabi AG, No. 2018-0300-JTL, 2018 WL 4719347, at *1
(Del. Ch. Oct. 1, 2018), aff’d, 198 A.3d 724 (Del. 2018).
144. See ABA, MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS COMM., MODEL MERGER AGREEMENT FOR THE
ACQUISITION OF A PUBLIC COMPANY 223 (2011) [hereinafter ABA, MODEL MERGER AGREEMENT].
145. Akorn, Inc., 2018 WL 4719347, at *1. This case received widespread attention due
to the Delaware Chancery Court’s holding that the target had suffered an MAE. See id. at
*52–53, *57.
146. Id. at *53 n.551 (citing Choi & Triantis, supra note 67, at 877).
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involve operating synergies between the buyer and seller, and thus
arguably contemplate a longer timeframe, which the Delaware
Chancery Court suggested should be taken into account when
assessing the materiality of an adverse effect.147 In contrast, scholars
propose that financial transactions, in which buyers use debt
financing to purchase a company with the aim of reselling it,
prompt a shorter timeline for the assessment of the materiality of
an adverse effect.148 This reasoning is compelling if courts know the
intended transaction type.
Yet, after the fact, a merger agreement might not make clear
which transaction type it was intended for and, in practice, the
boundaries between transaction types might not be evident. Most
basically, innovative transactions do not necessarily fit neatly into
one category. Strategic acquisitions, for example, regularly make
use of debt financing in the structure of the transaction. On the
other end of the spectrum, a private equity firm could acquire a
company that has strategic synergies with a company already in its
portfolio. To the extent that the MAE provisions ought to prompt
different approaches by courts depending on the goals of the
parties, which might be costly or difficult to establish ex post,149 this
significant context-independent module invites the risk of
misinterpretation or opportunism.
Parties might mitigate these risks by signaling the
distinctiveness of a contractual regime and thereby prompt courts
to apply different rules for different transaction types. However,
the development of appropriate interfaces demands a nuanced
approach and is not without its own learning and drafting costs.
Thus, the use of portable terms in new contexts, or the distinction
among contexts, as with the MAE provision, invites new forms of
uncertainty as well as learning and drafting costs.
More fundamentally, even when courts identify differences in
contract types, they often struggle to define and maintain the
boundaries between doctrinal tracks—making the boundaries

147. Id. For a discussion of the distinction between strategic and financial buyers, see
Afsharipour, supra note 15, at 1169–70.
148. See Choi & Triantis, supra note 67, at 877.
149. Whether this approach leads to optimal choices by parties ex ante is also a
question. I thank Cathy Hwang for this insight.
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somewhat uncertain for drafters.150 A recent study illustrates how
courts fail to define the characteristics of transaction types and of
party types leading to blurring doctrinal boundaries and questions
as to which doctrinal approach will apply.151 Indeed, the
boundaries between doctrinal approaches are not always clear even
in cases involving what we might think of as clearly distinct types,
such as consumer contracts as opposed to contracts between
sophisticated parties. As noted, the doctrine developed for one
transaction type can creep beyond the transaction type for which it
was designed.152 As a result, the transplantation of a provision into
a new context, especially when the distinctions in context are not
explicitly defined, brings with it the question of how the provision
is intended to operate in the new context. And, to the extent that
courts recognize a distinctive operation of a provision in a new
context, in the absence of established doctrinal boundaries, this can,
in turn, compromise the certainty of the same provision in the
original and other contexts.
2. Stickiness: Exacerbating the costs of portability
The discussion above illustrated some of the uncertainty and
costs of portability of provisions from one context to another. On
the one hand, courts might not accurately effectuate private
ordering when they treat like terms similarly across different
transaction contexts. On the other hand, as the preceding section
illustrates, a rule that aims to treat similar provisions differently can
invite uncertainty because the boundaries between transaction
types are not necessarily clear, especially in innovative contexts.
This section briefly connects the phenomenon of “stickiness” to the

150. Discussion among practitioners about the significance of MAE provisions in loan
agreements given the negative impact on cash flows resulting from COVID-19 illustrates
the uncertainty of doctrinal boundary drawing. Since most case law concerning MAE
provisions involves M&A transactions governed by Delaware law, practitioners speculate
about the extent this doctrinal treatment extends to MAE provisions in loan agreements,
which tend to be governed by New York law and negotiated and drafted differently due
to their distinct goals. See MAE in Loan Agreements: A Framework for Lenders and Borrowers
During the Current Crisis, AKIN GUMP STRAUSS HAUER & FELD LLP (Mar. 19, 2020),
https://www.akingump.com/en/news-insights/mae-in-loan-agreements-a-frameworkfor-lenders-and-borrowers-during-the-current-crisis.html.
151. Kastner & Leib, supra note 16, at 1304–10.
152. Id. at 1287–97.
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downsides of portability. It thereby identifies a factor that further
exacerbates modular design risk.
Specifically, scholars have noted a tendency of sophisticated
parties to revise standard provisions to correct for mistaken
interpretations more slowly than theories would predict.153 This socalled stickiness thus exacerbates costs of misinterpretation
precipitated by portable terms.
The much-discussed case of the pari passu clause, “a standard
provision in sovereign debt contracts that almost no one seems to
understand,”154 illustrates the risks of portability and the added
costs that can result from stickiness of terms.155 This provision,
which might have “migrated from cross-border corporate
documents” into sovereign debt contracts by being “copied by the
lawyers . . . who had not realized that such a clause was
meaningless in the sovereign context,”156 invited mistaken
interpretation by courts.
Prior to litigation around the term, the conventional wisdom in
the market was that the clause had no technical operative meaning
for sophisticated sovereign creditors, though it might have served
a communicative purpose.157 In any case, it was widely understood
153. See MITU GULATI & ROBERT E. SCOTT, THE THREE AND A HALF MINUTE
TRANSACTION: BOILERPLATE AND THE LIMITS OF CONTRACT DESIGN 5, 11 (2013) (“[B]oilerplate
clauses are sticky: They seem resistant to amendment even when amendment seems
desirable.”); Kahan & Klausner, supra note 45, at 728; Peter B. Rutledge & Christopher R.
Drahozal, “Sticky” Arbitration Clauses? The Use of Arbitration Clauses After Concepcion and
Amex, 67 VAND. L. REV. 955 (2014); Choi, Gulati & Scott, The Black Hole Problem, supra note
130, at 4.
154. Choi, Gulati & Scott, The Black Hole Problem, supra note 130, at 1.
155. See, e.g., GULATI & SCOTT, supra note 153; Choi, Gulati & Scott, The Black Hole
Problem, supra note 130; Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati & Robert E. Scott, Variation in Boilerplate:
Rational Design or Random Mutation, 20 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 1 (2018); Mark Weidemaier,
Robert Scott & Mitu Gulati, Origin Myths, Contracts, and the Hunt for Pari Passu, 38 LAW &
SOC. INQUIRY 72 (2013). For a discussion in connection with portability see Kastner & Leib,
supra note 16.
156. GULATI & SCOTT, supra note 153, at 14 (citing PHILIP WOOD, THE LAW AND PRACTICE
OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCE 6–23 (1984)); Lee C. Buchheit & Jeremiah Pam, The Pari Passu
Clause in Sovereign Debt Instruments, 53 EMORY L.J. 869 (2004).
157. See Anna Gelpern, G. Mitu Gulati & Jeromin Zettelmeyer, If Boilerplate Could Talk:
The Work of Standard Terms in Sovereign Bond Contracts, 44 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 617 (2019). For a
discussion of the interpretation of the pari passu provision in connection with first debt issued
by the Republic of Peru and then by the Republic of Argentina, see Choi, Gulati & Scott, The
Black Hole Problem, supra note 130, at 18–24; see also GULATI & SCOTT, supra note 153, at 3, 51–
52, 109–18 (discussing a lack of understanding of the meaning of the term by sovereign bond
market participants).
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not to grant investors a holdout right.158 However, in a series of
decisions, courts in Brussels and New York interpreted the clause
to preclude payouts under a restructuring agreement in the absence
of payment in full to holdout creditors.159 In doing so, the courts
failed to apply what the market considered the appropriate
interface in this context—an understanding of this standardized
term as not conferring a holdout right. Instead, the courts
mistakenly looked at the language through the framework of the
general contract presumption that all clauses have technical
meaning.160 This doctrinal approach ultimately contributed to
triggering the Republic of Argentina’s default on $29 billion of
debt.161 To the extent provisions are portable but not clear to
drafters, as in the case of pari passu, they can invite opportunistic
exploitation by a “contractual arbitrageur.”162
More troubling to scholars, the market failed for a time to revise
a provision that introduced a known risk.163 Thus, a provision that
appears portable and facially context independent invites the risk
of being included in an inapposite context. Moreover, once there,
the provision might prove resistant to removal. The fact that
markets may be slow to correct court error further contributes to
the risk that an unsuitable facially context independent term
can pose.164

158. See Choi, Gulati & Scott, The Black Hole Problem, supra note 130, at 18–24; see also
GULATI & SCOTT, supra note 153, at 3, 51–52, 109–18.
159. See Joint Appendix at A-1356, NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 699
F.3d 246 (2d Cir. 2012) (No. 12-105(L)) for an English translation of the Brussels case first
interpreting the pari passu clause in a Peruvian sovereign debt contract (cited in Choi, Gulati
& Scott, The Black Hole Problem, supra note 130, at 6 n.11). See NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic
of Argentina, No. 08 Civ. 6978, 2011 WL 9522565, at *2–3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 2011); NML
Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 699 F.3d 246 (2d Cir. 2012); NML Capital, Ltd. v.
Republic of Argentina, 727 F.3d 230 (2d Cir. 2013) (affirming the same interpretation in a case
against the Republic of Argentina). See generally GULATI & SCOTT, supra note 153.
160. GULATI & SCOTT, supra note 153, at 14.
161. Kathy Gilsinan, 65 Words Just Caused Argentina’s $29-Billion Default, ATLANTIC
(July 31, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/07/65-wordsjust-caused-argentinas-29-billion-default/375368/.
162. See Choi, Gulati & Scott, The Black Hole Problem, supra note 130, at 72.
163. GULATI & SCOTT, supra note 153, at 5.
164. See Choi, Gulati & Scott, The Black Hole Problem, supra note 130, at 2 (noting markets
may be slow to correct court error, which in the case of the Argentinian sovereign debt they
characterize as a “systemic problem that caused substantial costs”).

486

487

Systemic Risk of Contract

Scholars have identified this risk in connection with provisions
emptied of meaning.165 And one study suggests that even in the
context of private equity, where contract drafters innovate more
readily than in the sovereign bond context, drafters tend to add but
not delete provisions.166 Thus, portable provisions can invite
uncertainty in subtle ways, even when they seem to retain their
meaning. To the extent this uncertainty results in misinterpretation,
the resulting costs can be exacerbated by the phenomenon
of stickiness.

***

The discussion above identified diminished efficacy of
provisions and interpretive uncertainty prompted by modular
treatment of provisions and agreements in the current doctrinal
landscape. Some of the examples also suggest a third category
of risk.
The final category of modular contract risk that this Article
considers is latent triggers. The following section focuses on the
downsides of specialization, suppression of detail, and
decentralization enabled by compartmentalizing parts of a
contract. Overlooked interdependencies and drafting errors that
result from these features of modularity further complicate courts’
job of discerning the intentions of the parties.
C. Latent Triggers
The above discussion teased out dynamics that result from the
instability of design rules governing inputs and interactions in
contract. This section identifies a third category of risk, stemming
from the tradeoffs of modularity, which can further exacerbate the
challenge for courts of discerning intended meaning.
As modular design theorists note, a focus on developing
efficient parts does not necessarily result in overall precision.167
Compartmentalization can facilitate learning and the efficient use
of specialists’ expertise. To do so, it also invites decentralization in
the system and the suppression of nuance. Thus, nuances in
165. Id. at 3–4.
166. Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati & Robert E. Scott, Innovation Versus Encrustation:
Agency Costs in Contract Reproduction (Columbia L. Sch. Scholarship Archive, Working Paper
No. 2668, 2020), https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=
3672&context=faculty_scholarship.
167. Yoo, supra note 7, at 25–26.
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discrete sections and their implications can go overlooked in a
decentralized structure. As a result, design experts conclude that
there are greater risks from having too many modules rather than
from having too few.168
For this reason, in addition to rules governing the architecture
of a system and its interfaces, modular design theory identifies the
importance of standards of testing.169 Described as “the Achilles’
heel of modular design,”170 testing costs increase as modules are
added. In part, this reflects the tradeoffs between encapsulation
and the containment of nuance (or so-called “information hiding”)
within components, on one hand, and decentralization and
unintended interdependencies between parts, on the other.171
Applying design theory to contracts in practice, this section
explains how compartmentalization and specialization can invite
drafting errors that exacerbate the uncertainty introduced by the
categories of risk discussed above. A recent M&A transaction
serves as an illustrative case study of how these dynamics together
can introduce costs. The dynamics it suggests, however, are not
limited to M&A, and they impact a range of transactions enabled
by modular provisions and agreements, including international
business, construction, and insurance deals, to name just a few.
Before turning to a case study of how modular design invites
drafting errors, the discussion below briefly considers the forms of
testing that exist with respect to contracts.
1. Standards of testing in contract
In addition to reliable rules governing the inputs and
interaction of parts, design theory envisions testing as a
precondition for effective modular design. This section considers
the ways that contracts undergo testing in practice.
In modular design, testing usually happens at the end of a
design process, when the architecture and the interdependencies
between parts are known to the designers.172 In the case of
computer software, programs typically undergo user-acceptance

168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
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See BALDWIN & CLARK, DESIGN RULES supra note 7, at 77.
Id. at 272.
See Yoo, supra note 7, at 27.
BALDWIN & CLARK, DESIGN RULES supra note 7, at 76.
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testing to see how the program works in practice and to identify
bugs in the system.
In the case of contracts, precedential forms, such as
standardized terms, already reflect collective learning. However,
recent scholarship demonstrates how precedential forms can
themselves “drift” over time as they incorporate language changes
specific to a particular negotiation and thus degrade as effective
models.173 In addition, modes of testing contracts can be arbitrary
and high stakes. Scholars commonly refer to system “shocks” or
exogenous changes—in the form of an unexpected interpretation or
shifts in the market, for example—as instances that prompt design
change.174 On a deal-specific level, a change in circumstances
can prompt a test of the integrity and functioning of the
interdependencies of a particular set of deal documents.175 These
types of shocks test existing contracts after the fact and might
prompt systemic reconsideration. However, in the front-end
drafting process, the burden remains on the practitioner to identify
the effectiveness of the interdependencies of the documentation or
transaction at hand.
Seasoned practitioners look out for pitfalls as they draft and
presumably weigh drafting costs against the probability of a
contingency arising as they revise.176 A lead lawyer on a complex
transaction is typically responsible for reading through all the
documentation, while others could be charged with owning certain
documents or parts of a transaction. However, a senior lawyer’s
time is also costly, and practitioners involved in a deal can be
subject to cognitive limitations as a result of the salient aspects of
their negotiation. Some may follow a formalized checklist to
identify “bugs” or unforeseen interdependencies but, as contracts
173. See Anderson, supra note 19; Anderson & Manns, Boiling Down Boilerplate, supra
note 46.
174. See Choi & Triantis, supra note 67, at 851 (examining transaction design in the wake
of “unprecedented and unanticipated economic and financial shocks of the past couple of
years”); Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, An Empirical Study of Securities Disclosure Practice,
80 TUL. L. REV. 1023, 1023 (2006).
175. See Jeffrey M. Lipshaw, Lexical Opportunism and the Limits of Contract Theory, 84
U. CIN. L. REV. 217, 219 (2016) (noting that in practice parties will frame the meaning of a
contract opportunistically); see also Martin Marietta Materials, Inc. v. Vulcan Materials Co.,
56 A.3d 1072, 1075 (Del. Ch. 2012) (considering the parties’ intent concerning an NDA lacking
a “standstill” provision when the intended target of a proposed merger undertook a hostile
takeover of the presumed acquiror following a stock price change).
176. Choi & Triantis, supra note 67, at 853.
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become more complex, these too are necessarily incomplete. The
specialized structure of law firms, in which transactional lawyers
and litigators have separate areas of expertise—with transactional
lawyers steeped in market norms and litigators more attuned to
how terms may be viewed in litigation— further suggests limits to
this form of testing.177
Generally, litigation can be relatively rare but deals that “die”
or “blow up” involve significant stakes. The complex case study
below, involving a failed merger, illustrates the limitations of shock
testing for practitioners and parties.
2. Complex case study: Latent triggers
The following case study illustrates how modular contract
design can not only enable the potential progress of a deal but also
introduce possibilities for error.
This case study involves an M&A transaction that used
modular agreements to facilitate regulatory approval of a merger.
M&A agreements commonly address the risk of failing to obtain
necessary regulatory approvals such as antitrust clearance.178
Indeed, modular design can facilitate the resolution of
regulatory-related issues. For example, antitrust is an area of
specialization in which scholars have identified the potential
benefits of using a separate agreement to facilitate a complex
transaction.179 As the case study below demonstrates, however,
discrete agreements can invite errors—such as unanticipated
interdependencies or a failure to synchronize parts—that go
unnoticed in drafting. Moreover, this case study illustrates the
ways in which drafting errors can compound and be compounded
by intertextualism and modular drift, especially as transactions
become more complex.

177. See GULATI & SCOTT, supra note 153.
178. ABA, MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS COMM., MODEL MERGER AGREEMENT FOR THE
ACQUISITION OF A PUBLIC COMPANY 245 (2011).
179. See Hwang, supra note 6, at 1421.
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Chemtrade Electrochem Inc. v. Jones Day,180 a recent malpractice
suit by a chemical company against seasoned antitrust counsel,181
grew out of a proposed acquisition that ultimately failed to obtain
regulatory approval. The target company, Canexus,182 hired
counsel to advise the company on U.S. antitrust matters in
connection with a potential merger with Superior, another chemical
company.183 Both companies had operations in the United States
and Canada.184 To effectuate the merger, the parties entered into an
Acquisition Agreement that contained a “reverse termination fee”
provision (RTF). Here, the RTF was intended to require the acquiror
to pay the target company a fee in the event certain regulatory
approvals were not obtained before a date set by the parties.185
RTFs serve as prime examples of contract innovation through
modularity. In general, termination fees enable parties to allocate
and mitigate deal risk, including the risks related to factors that
could delay or preclude the closing of an announced acquisition
deal.186 It has long been common for M&A agreements to include a
standard termination fee provision obligating the target to pay the
acquiror in the event the deal fails to close in certain agreed

180. Complaint, Chemtrade Electrochem Inc. v. Jones Day, No. 2018-L-006388 (Ill. Cir.
Ct. June 20, 2018) [hereinafter Chemtrade Complaint].
181. Jones Day has been recognized as a leading firm in the area of antitrust law, see US
News
Best
Lawyers
Best
Law
Firms,
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT
https://bestlawfirms.usnews.com/profile/jones-day/overview/2104 (last visited Oct. 29,
2021), and the lead partner representing Canexus with respect to antitrust issues, Pamela
Taylor, had over twenty years’ experience in antitrust and competition law, including
serving as a staff attorney at the FTC in the Mergers I Division. Pamela L. Taylor (Pam) Of
Counsel, JONES DAY, https://www.jonesday.com/ptaylor/ (last visited Oct. 29, 2021).
182. Chemtrade, the plaintiff in the malpractice suit, was Canexus’s successor.
Chemtrade Complaint, supra note 180, at 1.
183. See Engagement Letter Regarding Potential Transaction from Pamela L. Taylor, Jones Day
to Ross Wonnick, Vice President, General Counsel and Corporate Secretary, Canexus Corporation
(Sept. 24, 2015), Chemtrade Complaint., supra note 180, Ex. A (specifying engagement by
company of Jones Day as antitrust counsel and confirming that the retainer does cover
securities laws representation).
184. Chemtrade Complaint., supra note 180, at 1.
185. See Arrangement Agreement Between Canexus Corp. and Superior Plus Corp.
(Oct. 5, 2015), Chemtrade Compl., Ex. B, Chemtrade Electrochem Inc. v. Jones Day, No. 2018L-006388 (Ill. Cir. Ct. June 20, 2018) [hereinafter Canexus Arrangement Agreement]. The fee
amount was denominated in Canadian dollars. Id.
186. Afsharipour, supra note 15, at 1163, n.1 (citing Robert T. Miller, The Economics of
Deal Risk: Allocating Risk Through MAC Clauses in Business Combination Agreements, 50 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 2007, 2015–34 (2009)).
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circumstances.187 Such a provision is intended to protect against the
target seeking a better deal from a third-party bidder.188 More
recently, parties have devised RTFs involving a payment by the
acquiror to the target in the event the deal fails to close in certain
agreed circumstances, such as the failure of the buyer to obtain
regulatory approval.189 RTF provisions can take different forms and
degrees of encapsulation to reflect the specific risk allocation
between parties.190 In addition, RTFs function as part of an
acquisition agreement that itself may be seen as one complex module
in a complex transaction involving other complex agreements.
In addition to provisions such as the RTF, the details of the
process of antitrust regulatory approval demonstrates the level of
specialization required in some aspects of a complex deal. Before
certain mergers or acquisitions can be completed, the Hart-ScottRodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, as amended (HSR
Act)191 requires parties to file for review with the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) and the Department of Justice. The typical
timeline for HSR review involves a thirty-day statutory waiting
period, after which, if the parties do not hear from a regulator, they

187. Afsharipour, supra note 15, at 1163–64.
188. Id.
189. See id. at 1167, 1207 (identifying the growing significance of reverse termination
fee provisions following aggressive private equity investment in 2005–2007); Howard J.
Rosenoff, Warren Silversmith & Tania Djerrahian, Reverse Breakup Fees as a Remedy for Failed
Financing
in
M&A
Transactions,
STIKEMAN
ELLIOT
(Sept.
29,
2016),
https://www.stikeman.com/en-ca/kh/canadian-ma-law/reverse-breakup-fees-as-aremedy-for-failed-financing-in-m-a-transactions. Traditionally used to allocate risk related
to regulatory approval in strategic acquisitions involving synergies between companies or
an aggregation of market power, RTFs have become more common in private equity.
Afsharipour, supra note 15, at 1169, 1181, 1183. Demonstrating how portable terms enable
innovation, changes to RTFs in private equity transactions because of innovations have, in
turn, been incorporated into strategic acquisitions. See id. at 1165–67, 1219.
190. M&A lawyers distinguish between financing and regulatory RTFs, depending on
whether the deal is contingent on financing or regulatory approval. See, e.g., Networks PTE
Ltd., BBX Main Inc., BBX Inc., Host Merger Sub Inc., and Black Box Corporation, Agreement
and Plan of Merger (Form 8-K) (Nov. 11, 2018) (including a reverse termination fee triggered
by failure of acquiror to obtain financing); Amended and Restated Agreement and Plan of
Merger by and Between HD Supply Holdings LLC, HD Supply GP & Management, Inc., HD
Supply Waterworks Group, Inc., HD Supply Waterworks, Ltd., HD Supply Inc. CD&R
Plumb Buyer, LLC. CD&R Waterworks Merger Sub, LLC, CD&R WW LLC & CD&R Merger
Sub LLC (July 14, 2017) (including a reverse termination fee triggered by failure to close by
drop dead date).
191. 15 U.S.C. § 18a (2018).
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may consummate the transaction.192 However, a regulator may
request more information from the parties (a “Second Request”),
prompting a more onerous process of review. The Second Request
typically creates another waiting period of thirty days.193
Given the “extremely burdensome” nature of Second
Requests,194 parties often enter into another agreement with the
regulator—a “Timing Agreement”—to extend the timing and
establish the scope of regulatory review.195 Itself a modular
innovation, a Timing Agreement with the FTC typically follows a
standard model196 and offers many of the benefits of modular
ancillary agreements discussed above. The agreement between the
parties and the regulator concerns solely antitrust review to
facilitate the process of obtaining regulatory approval.197 The
agreement enables the parties to manage the scope of the regulatory
review and possibly limit certain regulatory requests. A Timing
Agreement is also believed to lessen the likelihood that regulators
will reject a proposed transaction.198
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. FRANCO CASTELLI & CATHLEEN PETERSON, THE NUTS AND BOLTS OF SECOND
REQUEST COMPLIANCE 6 (2016), https://nysba.org/app/uploads/2019/02/NYSBA-SecondRequest-Nuts-and-Bolts-20161128-v5-JMC.pdf.
195. Premerger Notification Office Staff, Bureau of Competition, Getting in Sync with
HSR Timing Considerations, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Aug. 31, 2017, 8:57 AM), [hereinafter FTC,
Getting in Sync] https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/blogs/competition-matters/2017/08/
getting-sync-hsr-timing-considerations; see Bruce Hoffman, Timing is Everything: The Model
Timing Agreement, FED. TRADE COMM’N, (Aug. 7, 2018, 3:04 PM), https://www.ftc.gov/
news-events/blogs/competition-matters/2018/08/timing-everything-model-timingagreement (“Merger investigations commonly involve timing agreements, which—among
other things—provide an agreed-upon framework for the timing of certain steps in
the investigation.”).
196. See FTC Model Timing Agreement, FTC (Feb. 27, 2019), https://www.ftc.gov/
system/files/attachments/merger-review/ftc_model_timing_agreement_8-22-18.pdf; CASTELLI
& PETERSON, supra note 194, at 11 (describing FTC timing agreements as “bare bones”).
197. See Hwang, supra note 6, at 1427–33 (discussing the ways that discrete agreements
can facilitate party, issue and risk specificity and can add value by enabling the possible
development of a deal).
198. See CASTELLI & PETERSON, supra note 194, at 11 (asserting that in practice
agencies are “less likely to ‘bounce’ a Second Request” when a timing agreement has been
signed); Gregory E. Heltzer & Matt Evola, The Latest: DOJ Announces New Model Timing
Agreement for Merger Investigations, MCDERMOTT WILL & EMERY (Dec. 4, 2018)
https://www.antitrustalert.com/2018/12/articles/doj-developments/the-latest-doj-announcesnew-model-timing-agreement-for-merger-investigations/ (“While the use of timing
agreements are [sic] not mandatory, practically speaking, an attempt to avoid such an
agreement may encourage [regulators] to adopt a litigation stance . . . .”).
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In the case of Canexus and Superior, when issued a Second
Request by the FTC, the parties entered into a Timing Agreement
with the FTC to extend the period of antitrust review.199 Pursuant
to the Timing Agreement with the FTC, Canexus and Superior
agreed not to complete the proposed acquisition for at least an
additional sixty days—thereby extending the period in which the
parties could not proceed with the transaction. The agreement did
not, however, explicitly extend the second thirty-day default
waiting period under the HSR Act.200
Unfortunately for Canexus and Superior, the FTC ultimately
proved unsatisfied and sued to enjoin the deal.201 As it happened,
the FTC obtained a temporary restraining order enjoining
the transaction only after the second thirty-day statutory default
period had run, but before the end date specified in the Acquisition
Agreement and within the period of review under the
Timing Agreement.202
This failure to obtain regulatory approval was an anticipated
risk against which the RTF was intended to protect Canexus. In this
case, however, Superior challenged its obligation to pay Canexus
under the terms of the RTF, claiming the provision did not cover
the period for review added by the Timing Agreement. Put simply,
the discrete provisions and documents did not sync up.
Specifically, Superior argued that under the Acquisition
Agreement it was obligated to pay the RTF only if the parties failed
to obtain “HSR Approval” prior to the specified end date.203
Tracking the statutory language, the Acquisition Agreement
defined “HSR Approval” as “the expiration or early termination of
any waiting period, and any extension thereof.”204 Technically
speaking, the regulatory waiting period had expired by lapsing,
resulting in “HSR Approval” being obtained according to the literal
terms of the definition in the Agreement205—even though approval

199. Chemtrade Complaint., supra note 180, at 6–7 ¶¶ 30–33.
200. 15 U.S.C. § 18a (2018).
201. Chemtrade Complaint., supra note 180, at 7 ¶ 36.
202. Id. at 7 ¶ 6.
203. Id. at 6–7 ¶¶ 25–32; Canexus Arrangement Agreement, supra note 185, § 8.3
(Reverse Termination Fee).
204. Canexus Arrangement Agreement, supra note 185, § 1.1 (Defined Terms).
205. As the FTC now advises, “Timing agreements do not extend or otherwise toll the
waiting period provided by the HSR Act.” FTC, Getting in Sync, supra note 195 (emphasis added).
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by the regulator had in fact been denied. Superior thus disputed its
obligation to pay under the plain meaning of the provision.
This case illustrates a drafting error invited by the
decentralization of modular design. Also, reflecting the limits of
testing, the form of acquisition agreement used in this case was not
unique to these parties.206 The lawyers appear to have chosen a
precedent that had been used in the past for transactions involving
Canadian entities to benefit from the nuances and refinements
particular to that contract architecture. However, ordinary practice
had not tested this agreement to uncover this latent trigger in
relation to a Timing Agreement, and perhaps not even in relation
to an enjoined deal.
Given the reputational costs and potential malpractice exposure
for such an apparent error, it is hard to argue that this was a
considered risk that the drafters chose not to invest in fixing. More
compellingly, this error reflects the costs of existing modes of
testing and deal design that can be exacerbated by modular
structures, especially in a dynamic setting in which parties may be
negotiating and revising different parts of a deal under
time pressure.207
This case thereby demonstrates the risks of decentralization
that accompany the benefits of modularization.208 At the level of the
provision, a defined term such as “HSR Approval” serves to
encapsulate information for ease of use. In containing information,
however, a discrete provision can also obscure nuance. In this case,
the defined term “HSR Approval” hid the nuances of timing and of
the process of antitrust approval that escaped the notice of even a
sophisticated practitioner in the drafting process. Moreover, the
introduction of a second discrete agreement—the Timing
Agreement—further complicated the process and added to the
challenge of anticipating this bug.
This case also illustrates the risks of portability in connection
with innovation in complex transactions. The definition of “HSR
Approval” as “the expiration or early termination of any waiting
206. See, e.g., Emergent Biosolutions Inc., Arrangement Agreement between Emergent
BioSolutions Inc., Ontario Inc., Cangene Corp. (Form 8-K) (Dec. 12, 2013).
207. See Langlois, supra note 22, at 24–25.
208. The use of this model acquisition agreement was not unique to these parties. See,
e.g., Emergent Biosolutions Inc., Arrangement Agreement between Emergent BioSolutions
Inc., Ontario Inc., Cangene Corp. (Form 8-K) (Dec. 12, 2013).
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period, and any extension thereof” in this case appears to have been
ported from another context. This provision follows a common
formulation routinely used in other aspects of M&A agreements.
Specifically, the phrasing of the definition of “HSR Approval” used
in the Canexus-Superior agreement typically appears in the
“Conditions Precedent,” the section of merger agreements that
outlines preconditions for the consummation of a transaction.209
Notably, a review of the development over time of Conditions
Precedent in merger agreements reveals refinements through
modular design of this particular provision, which seem to have
contributed to this drafting mistake. Some merger agreements
entered into over a decade ago include a formulation of a Condition
Precedent that refers to the need for affirmative approval from
regulators to close the deal.210 Over time, however, drafters tended
to drop this language by way of clarification, reflecting the fact that
antitrust approvals can take the form of the expiration of a waiting
period rather than affirmative authorization.211 Yet, Conditions
Precedent to the parties’ obligation under the agreement will
typically also contain—albeit in a separately numbered clause—a
209. See, e.g., Integrated Silicon Solution, Inc., Agreement and Plan of Merger by and
Between Uphill Investment Co. and Integrated Silicon Solution, Inc., (Form 8-K) § 7.1(b)
(Mar. 12, 2015) (including similar language in Conditions Precedent for closing) (“Any
waiting period (and extensions any extension thereof) applicable to the transactions
contemplated by this Agreement Merger under the HSR Act shall have expired or been
terminated”); compare Ezcorp Inc., Merger Agreement between Ezcorp, Inc., Value Merger
Sub, Inc., and Value Financial Services, Inc., (Form 8-K) § 8.3 (June 5, 2008) (Conditions
Precedent to Merger Subs and Ezcorps Obligation to Close; Hart-Scott-Rodino) (“All
applicable waiting periods (and any extensions thereof) under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act
shall have expired or otherwise been terminated and the Merger Sub, EZCORP and the
Company shall have received all authorizations, consents, and approvals of governments
and governmental agencies.”); EMC Corp., Agreement and Plan of Merger among Denali
Holding Inc., Dell Inc., Universal Acquisition Co. & EMC Corp. (Form 8-K) § 3.01(e) (Oct.
12., 2015) (Representations; Noncontravention) (referring to the need to file “with respect to,
and the receipt, termination or expiration, as applicable, of approvals or waiting periods as
may be required under” the applicable antitrust law).
210. See, e.g., EZCORP, Value Merger Sub, Inc., and Value Fin. Servs., Inc., Ex. 10.2
Merger Agreement § 8.3 (Conditions Precedent to Merger Sub’s and EZCORP’s Obligation
to Close; Hart-Scott-Rodino) (June 5, 2008) (defining HSR Approval as “[a]ll applicable
waiting periods (and any extensions thereof) under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act shall have
expired or otherwise been terminated and the [parties] shall have received all authorizations,
consents, and approvals of governments and governmental agencies”) (emphasis added).
211. See ABA, MODEL MERGER AGREEMENT, supra note 144, at 245 (“The waiting period
applicable to the consummation of the Merger under the HSR Act shall have expired or been
terminated, . . . and any Consent required under any applicable foreign antitrust law or
regulation shall have been obtained.”).

496

497

Systemic Risk of Contract

provision requiring that no legal restraints or injunctions, or
threatened legal proceedings exist.212
This
evolution
of
the
Conditions
Precedent
to
compartmentalized subsections that separately account for (1) the
regulatory waiting period process, and (2) the possibility of an
injunction, reflects an effective use of modular design. However, by
compartmentalizing and then porting provisions to new contexts,
even within an agreement, drafters introduce the potential for
error. Thus, in the precedent used for the Canexus-Superior
Acquisition Agreement, a drafter seems to have picked up only the
lapse of waiting period from the Conditions Precedent. In
importing the provision to the RTF, the drafter failed to
contemplate the regulatory dynamic that could involve approval or
an injunction, given a Timing Agreement with a regulator. Thus,
when transplanted into a new context and utilized in relation to
another relatively discrete form, the refined provision opened the
door for uncertainty.
As this example shows, complex modules in the form of
agreements, such as Timing Agreements, as well as provisions,
such as RTFs, can facilitate a transaction and aid in documenting a
deal. However, modular structures can also contribute to
decentralization and suppression of nuance. These dynamics can
involve the unanticipated relationships among provisions
and across agreements. This, in turn, puts pressure on the
drafters responsible for identifying and anticipating how the pieces
work together. This case study also points to the information costs
that are imposed on drafters as a result of the ability to mix and
match modular provisions and agreements to document
transactions innovatively.

***

The phenomenon of unanticipated interdependencies from
drafter error is not limited to such complex transactions as the
Chemtrade case discussed above, though, naturally, it becomes more
likely as deals become more involved. In simpler transactions,
possible interdependencies from latent triggers can also raise
questions about the intent of the parties. Take, for example, the case
of Houston Exploration Co. v. Wellington Underwriting Agencies,

212. See id. at 247–49 (including model closing condition provisions that provide that
there are no legal restraints or litigation to block the transaction).
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concerning the intended scope of coverage manifested by an
insurance form.213
This case involved the question of whether a policy would
cover costs to a builder of an offshore platform resulting from
weather-related delays.214 The policy provided coverage for “all
risks” of physical loss and damage to property “[s]ubject to the
[policy’s] terms[.]”215 It indemnified for costs of repair or
replacement of damaged property, and a discrete provision
covering weather-related standby charges had been stricken by the
parties from the form.216
Reading the broad risk and indemnity provisions in the
insurance form to cover weather-related standby charges, the
dissenting judges of the Texas Supreme Court pointed to another
discrete provision in the agreement that provided for a deductible
coverage for standby charges. They read this provision to suggest
an intent to include coverage for standby charges.217 Another
plausible explanation for the inclusion of this clause, implicitly
adopted by the majority opinion, is that this clause, which appeared
in “another part of the printed form” escaped notice when the
parties marked up the document.218
Thus, even in a relatively simple form, the presence of discrete
sections focusing on different parts of the deal can introduce
uncertainty when all the parts have not been synched. Although
ex-ante investments in the structure of the form could mitigate
these risks, the nature of contract negotiation and revision in real
time puts pressure on practitioners’ ability to identify all the
interdependencies that can inadvertently signal intent to a court.
As such, this dynamic can exacerbate the existing uncertainty that
intertextualism and modular drift can introduce. On the other
hand, to the extent ex-ante investments in form eliminate these
risks, they can also suppress innovation due to the stickiness of
form and the costliness of developing effective modular design.

213. Hous. Expl. Co. v. Wellington Underwriting Agencies, Ltd., 352 S.W.3d 462, 462
(Tex. 2011).
214. Id.
215. Id. at 466 (second alternation in original) (quoting insurance form).
216. Id. at 466–67.
217. Id. at 476 (Jefferson, C.J., dissenting).
218. See id. at 473–74. (“The insuring portions of the policy did not provide coverage for
such charges even though the deductible clause was not stricken.”) (Johnson, J., concurring).
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***

This Part has identified three mutually exacerbating categories
of risk that can result from modular contract design. The next Part
identifies some of the systemic implications of these downsides of
modularity in contracts.
III. IMPLICATIONS OF THE DOWNSIDES OF MODULAR CONTRACT
DESIGN
The discussion in Part II identified three related categories of
risk that ought to be considered in weighing the benefits and costs
of modular design—the interaction of discrete parts, the issue of
context, and and the invitation of drafter error through
decentralization. This Part offers a preliminary analysis of some of
the implications of these dynamics.
Uncertainty in contracts can result when parties and courts fail
to follow the same interpretive approach—or in modular design
terms, when they presume different interfaces or architecture. The
discussion below identifies tradeoffs and makes preliminary
suggestions to courts and drafters to mitigate downsides of
modular contract design. In addition, it outlines implications for
contract theory and invites further scholarship.
A. Implications for Courts and Contract Doctrine
Most basically, as the preceding analysis demonstrates, the use
of modular design to manage the costs and risks of complexity
introduces additional dimensions of drafting costs and uncertainty.
Natural language resists compartmentalization, as the case studies
above demonstrate. To the extent that parties seek to use discrete
provisions to create more predictable outcomes, courts ought to
develop more predictable doctrine by explicitly considering the
implications of the interaction of facially discrete forms.
Thus, as a starting point for more predictable doctrine, courts
should focus on articulating relevant distinctions between
transaction types in the development of distinct doctrinal
approaches to different types of contracts—including, most
basically, consumer as opposed to sophisticated party contracts.219

219. See Miller, Party Sophistication, supra note 81, at 536 (“[T]he benefits of defining
sophistication are far outweighed by the costs of doing so.”).
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In doing so, judges must also remain sensitive to the porousness of
doctrinal boundaries and the potential for doctrine to creep and
lead to inapposite applications.220
In the same vein, it is important for judges to articulate their
reasons for discerning interactions among agreements and
provisions to enable predictable development of contract doctrine.
A consistent “one contract” rule that establishes the factors that
courts will consider with specificity and consistency—e.g., do all
parties to all the agreements have to be identical? must the
agreements be signed on the same day?—could facilitate a degree
of predictability. In developing the one contract rule, courts ought
also to consider the broad category of contract type to develop an
approach that serves its goals.
That said, the one contract rule on its own does not necessarily
determine the nature of the relationship between provisions.
Courts tend to privilege the substance of the transaction as they
perceive it. However, in cases involving innovation by the parties,
leaving the determination of the structure of the transaction to
courts can add to the costs of innovation given the potential
uncertainty discrete provisions can introduce. For this reason, in
sophisticated party transactions, as discussed in Part I, a textualist
approach on the part of courts might not solve the question of the
intended transaction structure and can invite opportunism.
Perhaps counterintuitively, the introduction of extrinsic evidence
to determine the intended interaction of highly discrete parts in a
complex or innovative structure could better serve the goals of
sophisticated party contracts. A contextualist default rule with
respect to the intended architecture when the architecture or
structure of the transaction is ambiguous could, at the very least,
incentivize drafters to include operative provisions that make the
intended transaction structure plain.221
Along these lines, the likelihood of error and latent triggers
introduced by the drafting process in certain transaction types
involving time pressure and complexity, such as M&A agreements,
suggests the benefit of applying a mutual mistake doctrine to
220. For a discussion of the benefits of defined doctrinal categories and the challenges,
see Kastner & Leib, supra note 18, at 1316–21.
221. For a discussion of how the design of some complex transactions suggests the
interdependency of textualist and contextualist approaches, see Jennejohn, supra note 8,
at 132–37.
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drafters’ errors.222 This approach runs counter to the prevailing
scholarly consensus that the goals of sophisticated party contracts
are best served by a textualist doctrinal regime but is one that courts
at times follow in practice.223 At the very least, the analysis of
modular risk types invites further discussion of a contextual
approach in different transactional contexts.
B. Implications for Drafting and Practice
As drafters innovate, changes to discrete terms can
inadvertently implicate other provisions. For example, parties
entering into deals during the COVID-19 pandemic may seek to
mitigate the heightened uncertainty by adding RTFs or new
provisions allowing them to renegotiate terms.224 While drafters are
focused on mitigating salient pandemic-related risks, they must
also remain attuned to the ways these discrete provisions invite
unintended interdependencies.225 The preceding discussion
demonstrates the need for drafters to attend to the interconnections
that modular contract design can introduce.
Most basically, within an agreement or a transaction structure,
drafters can use discrete provisions to clarify the intended
relationship between provisions or agreements. At times, drafters
222. See Mathis v. Wendling, 962 P.2d 160, 165 (Wyo. 1998) (affirming a reformation to
a contract to correct a mathematical error to reflect the parties’ intent that a debt be fully
paid); see also David A. Hoffman & Cathy Hwang, The Social Cost of Contract, 121 COLUM. L.
REV. 979, 995 (noting that, while “reformation has a bad reputation” in contract doctrine,
“courts have readily reformed contracts where there was mutual mistake.”); cf. Jesse M.
Cross, The Staffer’s Error Doctrine, 56 HARV. J. LEGIS. 83, 115–17 (2019) (advocating for
interpretive doctrine that recognizes compartmentalization and delegation in drafting
complex statutes, and the resulting possibility of error).
223. See Mathis v. Wendling, supra note 222, at 165; see also Robinhorne Const. Corp. v.
Snyder, 265 N.E.2d 670, 671–72, 674–75 (Ill. 1970) (gesturing toward the record of
negotiations to determine parties’ intent in construction contract comprised of American
Institute of Architects form contract to which riders and conditions were appended creating
modular ambiguity).
224. Sautter, supra note 5, at 43.
225. The changed context of the COVID-19 pandemic also triggers unforeseen
interdependencies among provisions. For example, recent cases prompted by COVID-19
have revealed a previously unremarked interrelationship between two typical merger
agreement provisions: the MAE closing condition and a target’s covenant to operate in the
“ordinary course of business” between signing and closing. See Gail Weinstein & David A.
Cooperstein, Redrafting the Standard ‘Ordinary Course Covenant” in Light of Extraordinary Events
Such as Pandemics, 266 N.Y. L.J. 75 (2021) (discussing the decisions in AB Stable v. MAPS
Hotels and Resorts One (Nov.30, 2020) and Snow Phipps v. KCake (Apr. 20, 2021) issued by
the Delaware Court of Chancery).
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relegate context to the recitals, the introductory provisions of a
contract, which are not necessarily binding on parties.226 Instead,
operative provisions can be used to express intended
configurations. For example, explicit operative provisions may
specify the intended architecture of related agreements or which of
two distinct agreements will govern in the event of conflict between
terms. To the extent drafters invest in drafting such operative
provisions, their efforts could lead to the development of a more
stable documentation structure for a given type of deal.
More generally, the preceding analysis highlights pitfalls of
specialization and the cognitive limitations that preclude effective
testing while drafting. Only a fraction of contract terms is litigated,
and to the extent that practitioners informally stress test as they
draft, they can be influenced by the negotiations and circumstances
of the moment. The particular context of a deal makes some risks
and interdependencies more salient to drafters, while obscuring
others.227 This perspective increases the difficulty drafters face in
identifying other unintended ambiguities or interactions in the
terms. Moreover, the practice of exchanging documents with
“tracked” or “redlined” changes, coupled with the human
tendency toward confirmation bias, further exacerbates the
challenge for drafters.228
Practitioners therefore rely heavily on recent familiar
precedents. Yet this too has been shown as a further source of
“bugs” in complex transactions.229 As a result of the degradation of
standard terms and contract forms in the drafting and negotiation
process, these precedents can introduce latent triggers for future
drafters. Scholars have therefore advocated for the upfront
development and use of model forms, which could reflect an
effective modular structure.230 This approach, which acknowledges
226. See Fugate v. Town of Payson, 791 P.2d 1092, 1094 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990) (stating
that a recital “is not strictly part of the contract”); TINA L. STARK, DRAFTING CONTRACTS: HOW
AND WHY LAWYERS DO WHAT THEY DO 82 (2014).
227. See DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 247–48 (2011) (discussing the
faulty heuristics of “WYSIATI” (what you see is all there is) and an “insider view” that
benchmarks based on immediate perspective rather than a broader view).
228. See id. (discussing the human tendency to favor data and views compatible with
existing beliefs).
229. See Anderson, supra note 19, at 557–58; see also Anderson & Manns, Boiling Down
Boilerplate, supra note 46, at 223.
230. Anderson & Manns, Engineering Greater Efficiency, supra note 6, at 689–97.
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potential interdependencies among provisions within a single
document, however, stops short of acknowledging the additional
dimension of contingency introduced by the interaction among
documents in a complex transaction. Given the use of multiple
documents and agreements as building blocks in complex deals,
the development of model forms for practice ought to take this
additional dimension into account.
To the extent that machine learning might mitigate costs of
testing and developing compartmentalized documentation,231 it
also requires a significant upfront investment in establishing the
system and gathering the inputs to do so—another recognized
tradeoff of modular design.232 And, in turn, these investments
could also diminish the incentives for certain forms of innovation
that involve redesigning the architecture of a particular transaction
type. Indeed, as with other forms of standardization, the upfront
costs of developing and refining modular deal documents and
transaction structures can hinder competition and innovation in
these very forms.
The case of OTC trading documentation, a developed complex
modular framework, illustrates these tradeoffs.
The OTC derivatives market, “a rather exotic species of
contract” used by sophisticated parties to hedge risk, involves a
developed complex system of related modular contracts and
provisions.233 Parties structure transactions around a standard
Master Agreement designed by the International Swaps and
Derivatives Association (ISDA), which serves as “the central
interface” against which parties can customize their deal through
subsidiary agreements.234 The Master Agreement contemplates
elections, modifications, and the importing of other terms by the
parties through schedules and reference to other ISDA prepared
forms and documents.235

231. See Williams, Predictive Contracting, supra note 63, at 634–39 (discussing developing
machine learning contract drafting technologies).
232. Yoo, supra note 6, at 25. Moreover, recent scholarship underscores the enduring
significance of natural language in transactions containing relatively modular machinereadable code. See Cohney & Hoffman, supra note 69, at 326–27, 85.
233. Hwang & Jennejohn, Deal Structure, supra note 6, at 307–08.
234. Id. at 308–09.
235. Feder, supra note 33, at 341.
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Because of the highly distinctive transaction type they engage,
ISDA documents prompt less doctrinal uncertainty. ISDA currently
produces definitional booklets to enable parties to benefit from the
standardization and compartmentalization of defined terms. Yet, as
noted in an industry whitepaper on developing OTC technologies,
this approach also prompts the publication of annexes “containing
often disparate updates to certain definitions.”236 Considering a
more modular approach, the industry whitepaper proposes
replacing “separate ISDA definitional booklets for different types
of derivatives with a modular ISDA library of individual
definitions,” which could be combined for an individual
transaction.237 This could also mean an added design cost to the
industry of checking for unintended interdependencies across types.
The ISDA forms demonstrate the tradeoffs of modular design.
Carefully developed so that the parts sync up for use by particular
sophisticated parties, highly specialized ISDA documentation can
prove hard to understand for many. In addition, the upfront costs
of establishing this OTC trading framework discourage
competition. As such, a highly modular transaction type with a
developed coherent architecture reveals the way investment in
modular design can potentially entrench a structure and thus limit
possibilities for contract choice.238
Different types of contracts and different modular structures
precipitate different kinds of costs and solutions, an area that
invites further scholarly attention considering the risk categories
identified in this Article. Thus for example, unlike the OTC
derivative framework, in which the overall architecture of the
transactions has been established, other transaction types, such as
construction deals, regularly make use of modular models in
complex arrangements that mix and match existing forms.239 In
transactions involving repeat players with shared norms, an
agreement to resolve disputes through arbitration could enable
arbitrators familiar with industry norms to mitigate the impact of
unintended interdependencies and drafting errors for the parties.
236. ISDA LINKLATERS, WHITEPAPER, supra note 6, at 22.
237. Id.
238. See Kahan & Klausner, supra note 45, at 727 (“When internal learning or network
benefits are present, they result in ‘switching costs’ . . . .”).
239. See, e.g., Robinhorne Const. Corp. v. Snyder, 265 N.E.2d 670 (Ill. 1970); see Circo,
supra note 33.
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In addition, disputes resolved through arbitration do not create
precedent for judges who are at risk of analogizing from these
specialized contexts to other contract types where the approach
might prove inapposite.
Property and liability insurance similarly makes use of modular
forms but does so in another distinctive doctrinal regime. Highly
standardized,
insurance
contracts
reflect customization
incrementally
through
“endorsements”
or
off-the-rack
amendments to industry forms.240 Yet, endorsements are drafted in
relation to the model agreement in any given year such that the
mixing and matching of older and newer templates can introduce
uncertainty or ambiguity. This, in turn, invites courts to construe
resulting ambiguity against the drafter,241 following a “first
principle of insurance law”242—suggesting another potential cost of
the mixing and matching of forms, which in contexts like insurance,
might be passed along to a consumer.
Thus, the optimal tradeoffs and dynamics of modular contract
design vary among transaction types. The above discussion
suggests factors practitioners and drafters ought to consider and
offers preliminary suggestions of ways to mitigate some downsides
of modular contract design. It offers a framework of risk categories
to invite future study of the dynamics of compartmentalization and
the use of facially discrete provisions in particular transaction types
as well as in the use of technology and machine learning to
mitigate risk.
As the above discussion suggests, however, the challenges
posed by the application of modularity in contract may not be so
easily avoided or overcome, not least because of inherent
characteristics of natural language as well as the basic tradeoffs of
modular design generally.
C. Implications for Contract Theory and Scholarship
In addition to implications for courts and practitioners, this
Article invites further consideration of the systemic risks and costs
of innovation through portable contract provisions in the context of
240. ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra note 31, at 37.
241. See, e.g., Ramara, Inc. v. Westfield Ins. Co., 814 F.3d at 660 (3d Cir. 2016).
242. Kenneth S. Abraham, A Theory of Insurance Policy Interpretation, 95 MICH. L. REV.
531, 531 (1996); see also ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra note 31, at 37.
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a fractured doctrine. It identifies an underappreciated risk that
results from increasing complexity and the portability of provisions
across contractual contexts, especially in the absence of articulated
doctrinal boundaries. Because the operation of contract language is
shaped by context, the porting of provisions into new contract
regimes and new configurations of terms can render those
transactions less certain. In addition, the use of provisions in new
contexts can call into question the operation of similar terms in
other contexts, thereby impacting the certainty and stability of
provisions in other contracts and across transaction types. In this
way, the mixing and matching of discrete contract building blocks
can not only introduce uncertainty into contracts for the parties to
a particular transaction, but also can potentially render even
standard terms less reliable for future drafters and parties to
other transactions.
Traditionally, “[f]reedom of contract” has been recognized “as
close to a universal positive principle as is accepted in contract
law.”243 Contract has thus been contrasted with property in which
there are “a limited number of standard forms” to control the
information costs to third parties who seek to acquire rights or
avoid liability.244 According to this line of thinking, parties that
create an idiosyncratic property right create externalities in the
market by raising the costs to third parties of gathering information
as a result of the presence of these idiosyncratic rights.245
Yet, information costs with respect to a contract impact parties
in the market as well. Standardization lowers information costs and
thus the costs of consent.246 Following this reasoning, a change to a
standard term—customization—threatens to increase the

243. Fairfield, supra note 12, at 1439; see also Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman,
Property, Contract, and Verification: The Numerus Clausus Problem and the Divisibility of Rights,
31 J. LEGAL STUD. S373, S380 (2002) (“[T]he utility of standard contractual terms and forms is
evidently not frustrated by the continuing availability of an infinite variety of nonstandard
contractual rights with unconventional and perhaps hard-to-measure characteristics”).
244. Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property:
The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1, 8, 26 (2000).
245. Id. at 27–33. For an illustrative hypothetical about the impact of the creation of
idiosyncratic rights on the market, see id. Others have critiqued this understanding but
nonetheless contrast contracts with property, in which they see “third-party information
costs [as] central to the . . . regulation of . . . rights.” Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 243,
at 374–75.
246. Fairfield, supra note 12, at 1403.
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information costs.247 Scholars have begun to recognize the
information costs of creating more types of contracts, largely with
respect to consumer contracts,248 and in identifying the “speciation”
of standard provisions through “drift.”249
However, the preceding discussion illustrates an additional
source of information costs through choice. It shows how
standardized provisions, even when they do not degrade, can
migrate to different doctrinal contexts, or be used in new
configurations or combinations that impact their meaning and
introduce uncertainty. The dynamics of modular contract design
thereby suggest that in certain cases, standardization is
“open- ended.”250 In other words, while some attributes have been
standardized, other features such the particular operation of a
provision in context, which might be more costly to discern, have
not.251 Portability of a term into a new context enables the
introduction of additional characteristics—whether resulting from
interdependencies between provisions or agreements or from a
distinction in transaction type that invites a different doctrinal
regime. And, the uncertainty that an innovative use of provision
introduces not only impacts the parties to that particular
transaction but can make the same provision less certain for other
parties who seek to rely on it in other contexts.
Put another way, the preceding discussion complicates our
understanding of standard provisions. Whereas commonly-used
provisions have been understood to confer the learning benefits of
reduced uncertainty and error costs,252 modular design threatens to
247. Id. at 1405.
248. See id. (discussing information costs in “mass-market, high-volume, low-value
transactions”); Oren Bar-Gill & Clayton P. Gillette, On the Optimal Number of Contract Types,
20 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 487, 491, 498 (2019) (implicitly recognizing the costs of creating
contract types with a focus on consumer contracts, such as mortgages and credit
card agreements).
249. Anderson, supra note 19, at 564 (quoting Anderson & Manns, Boiling Down, supra
note 46, at 245).
250. See Kenneth Ayotte & Patrick Bolton, Covenant Lite Lending, Liquidity, and
Standardization of Financial Contracts, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF
PROPERTY LAW 174 (Kenneth Ayotte & Henry E. Smith eds., 2011) (describing the use of a set
of loan characteristics that “do not provide a complete description of the rights and
obligations in each loan contract” to create standard securities backed by somewhat
idiosyncratic loans).
251. See id.
252. Kahan & Klausner, supra note 45, at 719–20.
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undo these benefits by enabling the introduction of error and
diminishing the certainty of a provision’s operation. And, while
widespread use of a provision has been shown to provide network
benefits through the increased certainty of the meaning and
operation of a provision,253 the possibility of distinct operations of
the same provision threatens to introduce uncertainty into the
network of users.
In highlighting the implications of modular contract design for
drafters and parties broadly, this Article borrows the notion of
systemic risk in markets, and particularly the possibility of a failure
that undermines the market’s purpose and operation.254 While the
notion of systemic risk has been developed in connection with the
hidden risks of complex financial systems, this Article analogizes
to this concept to highlight the risks that complexity can impose on
the operation of contracts. Just as financial systems generally
involve a series of interconnected markets and institutions that
serve to move capital to productive uses, so too the regime of
contracts involves interconnected transactional forms, structures,
and rules that aim to allocate responsibility and risk generatively to
the benefit of parties. In financial markets, hidden
interdependencies can enable a “trigger event [to] cause[] a chain
of bad . . . consequences.”255 As this Article explores, given the
complexity of transaction types, doctrinal regimes, and forms of
contracts—to name a few aspects of the system of contracts—a
shock or failure in the interpretation or operation of one contract
provision threatens to undermine the certainty of provisions not
only in contracts for a particular transaction but also across
transactions that seek to make use of similar provisions in different
contexts. More subtly, even in the absence of a pronounced shock,
these dynamics can degrade the operation of contract provisions
across contexts.
Thus, a modular approach to complexity, while a significant
tool in general, threatens in contract design to diminish the efficacy
253. Id. at 726–27.
254. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 204 (2008) [hereinafter
Schwarcz, Systemic Risk] (defining systemic risk in terms of the possibility of a shock or
failure that triggers a chain of losses that impacts the availability of capital). More generally,
scholars discuss “complex patterns of systemic fragility” that result from “the high degree
of interconnectedness among financial institutions.” See Saule T. Omarova, The Merchants of
Wall Street: Banking, Commerce, and Commodities, 98 MINN. L. REV. 265, 270–71 (2013).
255. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, supra note 254, at 198.
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of provisions and undermine their ability to facilitate the goals of
private ordering in different types of contracts and throughout the
system. As the Article suggests, without the establishment of a
coherent transactional architecture and doctrinal boundaries—
which potentially limit innovation at another level—innovation
through modular design can threaten to undermine the certainty of
provisions across contracts.
This theoretical contribution thereby suggests the need for
further study of how to mitigate the risks of modular contract
design and balance the costs of contract choice to other drafters and
across the doctrine. As scholars today are engaging the idea of the
optimizing the “number of contract types,”256 we must account for
the ways modular design can potentially limit the competition for
deal documentation and design, on one hand, and diminish the
efficacy of different contract types, on the other.
Sharing qualities with modular design, analogy involves a
degree of abstraction. It can thus expose not only similarities but
also points of distinction.257 By applying the analogy of modular
computer program and product design to contracts, the discussion
above highlights the ways that natural language and contract
doctrine resist compartmentalization.
CONCLUSION
Building on existing literature considering the potential
benefits of modular design to manage complexity and enable
innovation, this Article makes a necessary intervention by calling
attention to the costs introduced by modularity in contract. The
Article outlines the limits of modular contract design, which stem
both from the downsides of modular design generally as well as
from the limitations of the applicability of the idea of modular
product design to contract language in particular. In doing so, it
identifies the impact of a fractured doctrine, in which different
kinds of contracts are treated differently, and of the possibility of
easily configuring agreements through new combinations of
discrete provisions. It shows how these choices can diminish the
efficacy and reliability of even standardized provisions.
256. See Bar-Gill and Gillette, supra note 248; see also DAGAN & HELLER, supra note 2.
257. Along similar lines, “the act of metaphor” has been provocatively described as “a
thrust at truth and a lie.” See THOMAS PYNCHON, THE CRYING OF LOT 49, at 105 (1965).
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Given the aim of contract to facilitate private ordering, legal
thinkers have long recognized the challenge posed by language,
which is necessarily contextual. Modular design in contract does
not dispose of the challenge. As such, the discussion above invites
further consideration of the dynamics of modular contract design,
not only at the intra-contract level, between provisions, but also at
the inter-contract level, between portable agreements that enable
complex transactions, especially as they play out in different
structures of contract against a backdrop of fractured doctrine.
As this Article shows, like the operation of natural language,
there is a limit to the extent to which contract language can be said
to remain between the parties. Just as language exists in context,
even discrete, otherwise effective, terms can become ambiguous.
Thus, as parties draw on existing models or seek the benefits of
standardization, variations through new configurations or
transaction contexts can introduce costs into the market. And, at the
same time, designing stable frameworks of terms can be costly and
inhibit innovation. We must therefore recognize and contend
with the risks of modular contract design as we consider the
benefits and modes of enabling contract choice in our increasingly
complex world.
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